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ABSTRACT 
This study analyzes the requirements of CA officers to operate successfully in the 
United States’ present and future military interventions. First the study assesses the 
current and future threat situation combined with the most recent United States policy 
and doctrine to determine the skill set required of current and future CA officers. Second, 
this study critically evaluates the current Army Civil Affairs (CA) Officer educational 
pipeline from commissioning through field grade officer to determine the skills CA 
officers with which the military indoctrinates and trains CA officers. The study compares 
the required skill set to the existing curriculum, and additional skills not incorporated into 
the existing CA officer training are described and examined for relevancy. The study 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Secure and serve the population. The Iraqi people are the decisive ‘ter-
rain.’ Together with our Iraqi partners, work to provide the people 
security, to give them respect, to gain their support, and to facilitate 
establishment of local governance, restoration of basic services, and 
revival of local economies. (Petraeus, 2008, p. 2)  
The opening lines of multinational force Iraq commander General Petraeus’ 
counterinsurgency guidance reflect a shift, many years after an insurgency began in Iraq 
in 2003, to a view of the population as the focus of the United States (U.S.) war effort. 
The U.S. military’s Civil Affairs (CA) officers are the subject matter experts on the civil 
terrain of the battlefield who provide this critical expertise to facilitate U.S. goals.  
A. PURPOSE 
The 2005 National Defense Strategy and the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review 
address the threats of failing and failed states and ungoverned areas that face the U.S. 
military, and emphasize stability operations and other important “new” capacities the 
U.S. military should have to tackle them. In response, the Department of Defense’s focus 
on economic development in support of stability operations should increase in pre/post 
conflict environments. More evidence of this shift is in Department of Defense Directive 
3000.05, which directs the Army to integrate stability operations into its training in 
additional to conventional warfare.  
This operational shift is slowly permeating throughout the military’s structure, 
including training and education. Civil Affairs (CA) generalists and functional specialists 
bear the responsibility of planning and implementing such policy at the tactical, 
operational, and strategic levels. Despite these tremendous responsibilities, most CA 
personnel receive little more than their introductory training to prepare them for their 
economic and political development roles; they must often instead develop knowledge 
through their civilian sector jobs or “on the job training.” A new CA officer (O3, or 
Captain) attends the CA qualification course (CAQC), which covers basic CA 
responsibilities and CA’s role in the “Big Army.” The next course the officer attends as 
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an O4 or Major is Intermediate Level Education (ILE). Neither of these courses teaches 
the CA officer how to conduct stability or reconstruction operations. Following ILE, the 
Army would likely employ a CA officer as an operational or strategic planner. 
1. Background and Origin 
The history of civil affairs in the United States precedes the Civil War. One of the 
earliest examples of the military’s conducting civil affairs is the Mexican War of 1845. 
After making quick work of opposing forces, the military set about administering the 
conquered territories (Sandler, 1994, p. 35). General Winfield Scott utilized his troops to 
establish security, enforcing standards on both his own troops and the local population. 
The military government ultimately focused on six key areas: fiscal, public works, public 
health, public safety, legal, and education (Sandler, 1994, p. 37). Though facing many 
challenges, the military commanders emphasized fairness and autonomy of the local 
government they were establishing (Sandler, 1994, pp. 41-43).  
Another of the most often-cited historical examples of the U.S. civil affairs is the 
reconstruction period following the Civil War. During this period, the Army heavily 
invested in judicial systems, economic development, and caring for freed slaves, among 
other civil activities (Guttieri, 2008c, p. 12). 
The U.S. military played similar roles in subsequent conflicts in which the U.S. 
was involved. Finally, during World War II, the USG officially integrated specific CA 
forces into the military as a specialized branch to perform these functions. CA forces 
administered “areas captured or liberated by U.S. forces before civilian administrators 
were present to take over” (Simons & Tucker, 2003, p. 83).  
As the term “civil” implies, civil affairs forces differ from other aspects of the 
military by focusing on interaction with the civilian population (Guttieri, 2003, pp. 99-
100). CA forces help form the bridges between the U.S. military and the civilian 
population. “The key to understanding the role of CA is recognizing the importance of 
leveraging each relationship between the command and every individual, group, and 
organization in the operational environment to achieve a desired effect” (Headquarters, 
Department of the Army, 2006b, p. 1-1). CA Officers routinely participate in operations 
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encompassing the operational spectrum from stability operations designed to prevent 
conflict to post-conflict reconstruction efforts designed to facilitate regional stability. 
These operations may be in support of conventional and unconventional elements, 
potentially involving close cooperation with international and non-governmental 
agencies.  
The core capabilities of CA forces are civil operations and civil reconnaissance. 
CA’s core tasks include civil information management, populace and resource control, 
foreign humanitarian assistance, nation assistance and support to civil administration. 
Post-conflict, CA forces help to establish order and to provide services for the local 
population (Guttieri, 2003, p. 95). This includes civic action and humanitarian assistance 
such as building schools, laying roads, or digging wells as well as establishing and 
managing policy, such as governmental and financial infrastructures (Guttieri, 2003, p. 
100).  
While these actions do not necessarily change the population’s living conditions, 
they facilitate friendship and relationship building. This helps with operations such as 
those in Iraq and post-conflict reconstruction. Civic action thus “doubles as a force 
multiplier.… it helps dry up the sea of supporters in which opposing forces swim by 
providing a more stabilized, improved, and secure local environment” (Simons & Tucker, 
2003, p. 83).  
2.  Doctrine 
According to the latest Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA Pam) 600-3, 
which describes the Army’s officer career fields and paths, CA personnel are those who 
are capable of planning, organizing, and executing CA operations and supporting civil-
military operations (CMO)1 (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2007, p. 179). CA 
                                                 
1 Civil Military Operations are the activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or 
exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and 
authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate 
military operations to consolidate and achieve operational U.S. objectives (Office of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, 2008b, p. 88). 
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forces, other military forces, or a combination of the two can perform CMO 
(Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006b, p. 1-1). The mission of CA forces is  
to engage and influence the civil populace by planning, executing, and 
transitioning CA operations in Army, Joint, interagency, and multinational 
operations to support commanders in engaging the civil component of 
their operational environment…to enhance civil-military operations or 
other stated U.S. objectives before, during, or after other military 
operations. (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2007, p. 179) 
CA officers are those who should possess the specialized skills to oversee and to 
execute these functions. The Army divided the CA Officer corps into two categories: CA 
Generalists, and Functional Specialists. Functional Specialists, found only in the United 
States Army Reserve (USAR), possess civilian core competencies including “public 
health and welfare, public safety/rule of law, public administration/governance, public 
works/infrastructure, business administration/economic stability, and public education 
and information” (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2007, p. 179). CA Generalists 
lead teams of enlisted specialists and advise key leaders on staffs in CA policy, strategy, 
and execution.  
Figure 1 illustrates the integrated nature of Civil Military Operations within a 
combatant or unified commander’s operations. CA officers usually form a CMO staff that 
plays a key role in assisting commanders in facilitating relationships with external 
agencies such as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), intergovernmental 
organizations (IGOs), and the host nation (HN), and serve as subject matter experts 
(Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008b, p. I-21).  
The CMO staff plans its operations according to the CA core tasks, as illustrated 
in Figure 2. Civil military operations centers (CMOCs) and their civil liaison teams 
(CLTs) work with the Civil Affairs planning teams (CAPTs) to facilitate the coordination 
effort with the external elements and synchronize them with those of the Civil Affairs 
Teams (CATs) and the CA functional specialists (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 




Figure 1.   Civil-Military Operations Relationships (From Office of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, 2008b, p. I-20) 
The CA forces plan and direct their operations towards “a clearly defined, 
decisive, and attainable goal” that supports the commander’s military objectives and 
ultimately his political objectives (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006b, p. 1-9). 
For example, at the strategic level, the goal is on “larger long-term global or regional 
issues such as economic development and stability” (Headquarters, Department of the 
Army, 2003, p. 1-5). The operational level focuses on “immediate and near-term issues 
(for example, dislocated civilian [DC] operations, public safety programs, and so on), 
synchronization of CMO support to tactical commanders, and integration of interagency 
operations with military operations,” while the tactical level addresses even more urgent 
needs such as “food distribution, local security programs, basic health service support to 
the local populace, and support of IGO and NGO humanitarian operations” 
(Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2003, p. 1-5). 
 6
  
Figure 2.   CA Operational Support Structure (From Headquarters, Department of the 
Army, 2006b, p. 1-3) 
The demand for CA specialists exploded during the conflict in Iraq. As a result of 
the high number of deployments and operational requirements, the United States Army 
Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC) reevaluated the 
organization of Reserve CA units, which was composed mostly of teams of functional 
specialists (CAT Bs) as opposed to teams composed of CA generalists (CAT As). The 
result shifted the balance of functional specialists and generalists in the Reserve forces so 
that the majority of CA forces are now generalists (G. Woodson, personal 
communication, November 11, 2008). The high demand for CA officers and the Reserve 
to Active duty force ratio also had the effect of blurring the distinction between 
functional specialists and generalists, to the point that leaders interacting with CA 
officers now expect all of them to know and understand the civilian core competencies 
listed above (J.K. Owens, personal communication, November 4, 2008; G. Woodson, 
personal communication, November 11, 2008). 
Though the War in Iraq brought the missions of the Reserve and Active duty 
forces closer together, the discussions about CA forces had another unforeseen impact. 
As the sole CA proponent and manager, SOCOM managed all CA personnel 
deployments, assignment, and training. Traditionally, primarily Active duty CA forces 
supported SOF operations, worked with embassies and performed interagency missions. 
Reserve CA forces supported conventional forces such as brigades and combatant 
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command headquarters. Because only Reserve CA forces have functional specialists, the 
CA functional specialists support both types of missions. In 2004, Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld issued several snowflakes2 questioning the assignment of all CA forces 
to SOCOM (G3 MOSO-SOD, 2004; K. Guttieri, personal communication, October 9, 
2008). Rumsfeld questioned SOCOM’s operational control of CA forces because of the 
mission dichotomy between conventional Army and SOF support.  
In 2006, the Secretary of Defense made the final decision to split the CA forces, 
assigning the Reserve CA forces to United States Army Reserve Command (USARC) 
and leaving the Active CA forces with SOCOM. SOCOM effectively lost control of the 
Reserve CA forces except through proponency and doctrine. USARC now has complete 
responsibility, control, and authority for staffing, mobilizing, and training the Reserve 
CA forces.  
Instead of improving CA’s relationship with the conventional Army, the change 
seemingly diluted CA missions and experience. With the current operational situation, 
both Active and Reserve CA officers find themselves assigned to support conventional 
Army and SOF. During peacetime, CA forces may find themselves relegated back to 
their traditionally divergent missions. This may not have a significant impact on CA 
generalists, but the functional specialists will lose a significant link to SOCOM’s 
missions and operations, including deployments and exercises, which could impact CA 
experience and expertise during the next large military conflict or intervention. 
Most importantly for this thesis, the reorganization placed the impetus for training 
onto USARC, which until recently, lacked any personnel with CA experience. The 
resources, funding, and mission of USARC is different from that of SOCOM. As a very 
small, specialized branch, CA units and personnel may not receive the funds they need to  
sustain critical training and skills. The separation also prohibits CA personnel from 
attending the same training from SWC as Active duty CA officers, from experienced CA 
NCOs and officers.  
                                                 
2 A “snowflake” is an action memo that requires a formal reply from the staff member to whom it is 
directed.  
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The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps also have CA officers, though the Army has the 
preponderance of the forces. In the Navy, CA is a temporary duty for which an officer 
receives several weeks of training and then serves as a CA officer for two or more years. 
While organizational culture is changing, officers who perform this duty may be at a 
disadvantage because their hierarchy accords less relevance to a CA job compared to one 
in the officer’s primary career field (G. Woodson, personal communication, November 
18, 2008).  
The Marine Corps has two civil affairs groups (CAGs), both part of the Reserve 
component. All of the personnel are CA generalists. The CAGs belong to the Marine 
expeditionary force (MEF) to support and expand the MEF’s capabilities or that of 
another Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2003, p. VI-2). 
During the Iraq conflict, CAGs deployed teams to support brigades throughout the 
country (COL Jenkins and team, 2007). 
Each of these forces develops and executes its own training. The forces share 
common guidance from Joint Doctrine that provides information on U.S. stability 
operations and CA, JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and JP 3-57, Civil Military Operations, 
respectively. 
B. THESIS 
This thesis argues that a mismatch exists between the current skill demand for 
military CA officers and the skill supply. This thesis supports the argument through an 
analysis of current United States Government (USG) policy, the future threat, and current 
operations to determine the current skill set demanded of CA officers and comparing that 
skill set to that taught through a CA officer’s professional military education (PME) and 
development.  
C. OUTLINE 
This thesis progresses as follows. Chapter II determines the demand for CA 
officers by assessing the current United States’ threat environment, the resulting national 
and DoD policies and missions evolving in response to those policies, and current CA 
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roles worldwide. The current and future CA missions, threat assessments, and changing 
policy generate capability requirements and shortfalls. Chapter III analyzes the supply of 
these capabilities and requirements by reviewing the current CA educational pipeline. 
Chapter IV compares the demand indicated in Chapter II to the supply in Chapter III and 
identifies any shortfalls. Chapter V concludes with recommendations for change and 
improvement in the CA educational pipeline and identifies other CA areas of concern for 
future study. 
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
The increased demand placed on CA forces since the inception of the Afghanistan 
and Iraq conflicts produced significant changes and discussions both within and about the 
Civil Affairs community. As a result of these discussions, the CA branch is rapidly 
evolving. As with any bureaucracy, change is slow, with formal doctrine and education 
often the last to adapt. This thesis seeks to understand the limitations and restrictions 
placed on the educators, who are limited to their fixed curricula and does not address the 
Army’s system for integrating changes and updates.  
During the course of research for this thesis, the Office of the Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations Capabilities requested that the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) conduct an independent assessment of DoD 
Civil Affairs capabilities (Hicks, 2008). The study examines the following issues: 
• What are DoD Civil Affairs forces required to do in accordance with 
USG and DoD policies from the tactical to strategic levels of war? 
• What are the gaps between USG/DoD policies for stability and 
reconstruction operations, and DoD Civil Affairs policy, doctrine and 
structure? 
• What structure adjustments are required to ensure sufficient and efficient 
utilization of DoD Civil Affairs capabilities to support both MCO and IW 
missions? 
• What changes should be made to DoD Directive 2000.13 “Civil Affairs” 
to ensure DoD Civil Affairs capabilities can support a whole-of-
government approach for stabilization and reconstruction operations? 
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• What is the appropriate mix of Special Operations Forces (SOF) and 
General Purpose Forces (GPF) Civil Affairs capabilities to support the 
range of military operations? (Hicks, 2008). 
Many of the questions in the study overlap with the subject of this thesis, and 




II. THE NEED FOR CIVIL AFFAIRS IN THE CURRENT AND 
FUTURE THREAT ENVIRONMENT 
This chapter analyzes the post-9/11 threat environment and the national security 
policies, directives, and military operating concepts the United States Government (USG) 
issued to address the new operational environment. The recently released 2008 National 
Defense Strategy highlights the need for the United States (U.S.) to develop capabilities 
to engage in non-conventional operations. As the USG first noted in the 2005 National 
Defense Strategy (NDS) and articulated in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), 
the likelihood of the U.S.’ engaging in unconventional or irregular warfare3 (IW) is of 
higher probability than conventional conflict. As such, the need for irregular warfare 
capabilities, to include civil affairs, is likely to increase dramatically over the foreseeable 
future. 
In response to its augmented responsibilities and expanded mission sets, the 
Department of Defense’s (DoD) focus on civil and economic development, sometimes 
called “state-building,” in support of stability operations (SOs) increased. Current 
operations in post-conflict Afghanistan and Iraq reflect the Army and other services’ 
activities in these areas.4  
The 2005 Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 reflects the increased need 
for SO capability, and directs the Army to integrate SOs into its training in addition to 
conventional warfare. Recent publication updates in many of the military’s tactical and 
doctrine manuals integrate this change. The new emphasis indicates that SOs are now 
part of the military’s greater overall strategy of waging IW, which includes 
counterinsurgency (CI), counterterrorism (CT), stability operations (SOs), and foreign 
internal defense (FID) (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2008a, pp. 2-4).  
                                                 
3 This paper defines IW as “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and 
influence over the relevant populations” (U.S. Special Operations Command & Marine Corps Combat 
Development Command, 2007, p. 6). 
4 DoD defines “Stability Operations (SOs)” as “Military and civilian activities conducted across the 
spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in States and regions” (Department of 
Defense, 2005, p. 2). 
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With these new policy documents and manuals come personnel, tactical, and skill 
requirements. For the CA community, understanding this new demand signal is important 
if CA is to provide the desired capabilities articulated in these policy documents. This 
chapter analyzes the current and future operational environments and identifies the 
demand for U.S. personnel capabilities to conduct civil-military operations. Subsequent 
chapters will assess the CA supply and determine whether there is a mismatch between 
the supply and demand for CA functions. 
A. A CHANGING THREAT ENVIRONMENT 
1. Defining the Future Threat and Irregular Warfare 
Throughout the Cold War, the U.S. focused on facing the Soviet Union’s (USSR) 
conventional force capabilities. In 1991, the USSR’s fall appeared to sound the death 
knell of communism and the last obstacle to a free world. At this time, even China was 
liberalizing its economy, “decollectivizing” agriculture and deregulating the sales of 
many consumer goods (Fukuyama, 1989, p. 7). This apparent triumph of liberal 
capitalism over communism and socialism meant that world wars would be a historical 
anachronism – the U.S. military could downsize, and the population could focus 
internally on its own economic development and interests.  
Despite the “conquest” of communism, conflict continued around the world, such 
as Somalia, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, and the Rwandan genocide. These conflicts were 
not ideology based, as in the U.S.-USSR democracy-communism sense, but rather 
appeared to stem from ethnic, economic, or religious causes. The U.S. seemed 
uninterested unless the conflict affected U.S. economic interests, getting involved in the 
Iraq-Kuwait conflict both to aid its ally Kuwait and to protect a significant source of its 
oil. Only with United Nations (UN) or other international pressure did the U.S. intervene 
in the Somali conflict, and completely denied the genocide in Rwanda. As long as these 
issues remained local, countries like the U.S. remained aloof.  
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Political scientist Samuel Huntington described this next phase of conflict a 
“Clash of Civilizations,” in which cultural differences are the root cause of conflicts.5 
According to his theory, increased globalization and interaction through travel, media, 
trade, and the internet would result in cultural conflicts, with war a possible outcome 
(Huntington, 1993, pp. 23-24). Martin van Creveld also saw conflict “motivated…by 
fanatical, ideologically-based, loyalties” (van Creveld, 1991, p. 197). The religious roots 
of the most recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq reinforce these theories. 
Martin van Creveld foreshadowed how these conflicts would be fought in the 
future: low-intensity conflict6 (LIC). He compared conflicts such as the Vietnam War to 
conventional wars and the inability of highly technological, conventional, regular military 
forces to face that threat (van Creveld, 1991, pp. 18-28). “In the future, war will not be 
waged by armies but by groups whom we today call terrorists, guerillas, bandits, and 
robbers” (van Creveld, 1991, p. 197).  
The most publicized and recognized threats to the U.S. today are sub-national 
groups espousing “a violent extremist ideology” and other aggressive philosophies, 
which are not limited by borders, states, the law, or human life. Many such groups arise 
from the incapability of many states to effectively deter or capture these groups; the 
resulting insecurity provides a fertile environment for recruitment and violence. Rogue 
states7 such as Iran and North Korea exacerbate problems by funneling money, weapons, 
and supplies to these groups or providing a safe area for these groups to train or perform 
illicit criminal acts to support their violent activities (Gates, 2008a, p. 2). 
LIC is closely related to another concept, termed “Fourth-Generation Warfare 
(4GW).” 4GW is more political than technical and is the only type of warfare in which 
                                                 
5 Samuel Huntington described a civilization as a group with a common history, language, religion, 
customs, institutions, and self-identification of its people (Huntington, 1993, pp. 23-24). 
6 van Creveld describes the principal characteristics of LIC: “First, they tend to unfold in “less 
developed” parts of the world….Second, very rarely do they involve regular armies on both sides, though 
often it is a question of regulars on one side fighting guerillas, terrorists, and even civilians on the 
other….Thus, most LICs do not rely primarily on the high-technology collective weapons that are the pride 
and joy of any modern armed force.” (van Creveld, 1991, p. 20). 
7 The term “rogue state” traditionally applies to states that the threaten world peace by failing to 
adhere to the rule of law. These states usually have totalitarian regimes, support terrorism, and advocate the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (Litwak, 2000). 
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the U.S. failed to achieve a decisive victory, such as in Vietnam. 4GW focuses on 
sending a message to enemy policymakers to convince them to change their mind on an 
issue of interest. These messages can be disseminated through media, legal political 
channels, and more forcefully, through violence and bloodshed (Hammes, 2005, pp. 2-3). 
Because of its low cost and minute footprint, LIC is the best means for smaller, weaker 
forces to fight larger forces and equalize opportunities for success.  
Current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan bear this out. Terrorism, guerilla 
warfare, and insurgency are direct implementations of this type of warfare. Because these 
types of forces usually lack the technology, equipment, and numbers to fight the enemy 
directly, they avoid direct confrontation and instead focus on imposing costs on the 
enemy. These costs include “the loss of soldiers, supplies, infrastructure, peace of mind, 
and most important, time….Its goal is to destroy not the capacity but the will of the 
attacker” (Arreguín-Toft, 2001, p. 103). 
The military accepted the pervasiveness of LIC and updated its doctrine, terming 
LIC “Irregular Warfare (IW).” The military first coined the term IW to refer to anything 
not conventional warfare, referring to the U.S.’ using irregular means to battle 
unconventional enemies (Safire, 2008, p. 22). IW differs significantly from conventional 
warfare in that it discourages direct actions that may cause secondary harm to the local 
population; one of the key issues with IW is the inability to separate the fighter from the 
population. Figure 3 shows the different focus of conventional warfare on the military 
versus IW’s focus on the population to effect the desired change. Because the enemy 
looks like any other citizen, unfocused attacks directed at guerillas have the potential to 
harm innocent bystanders instead of the intended target. The success of guerillas, 
insurgents, and terrorists8 comes from their tacit acceptance by the majority of the 
population. IW is a long-term proposition, and campaign planning for IW requires a 
timeframe of years and decades, not weeks or months. 
                                                 
8 An insurgent is a member of a political party who rebels against established leadership (Office of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008a, p. 269). 
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Current operations support these facts. The COIN operations conducted by U.S. 
forces in Operation Enduring Freedom Philippines (OEF-P) are one illustration. In this 
operation, U.S. SOF, including CA forces, conducted operations designed to support, 
enhance, and develop civilian infrastructure and control, while simultaneously working 
with local security forces and government organizations to improve efficiency and 
effectiveness. For example, SF units worked with local military forces to improve their 
ability to find and capture insurgents. CA forces conducted assessments to determine the 
best way to meet the needs of individual towns and areas, and built schools or dug wells 
depending on local requirements (Wendt, 2005, pp. 5-7).  
 
Figure 3.   Contrasting Conventional & Irregular Warfare (From U.S. Special Operations 
Command & Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 2007, p. 8) 
Recent operations in Anbar Province in Iraq also support the effectiveness of this 
approach. In Anbar, the local population collaborated with U.S. forces in building and 
development projects, and learned how to fight the insurgents. In this instance, insurgents 
alienated the local population by murdering tribal leaders. The new trust in the U.S. and 
frustration and anger aimed at the terrorists inspired many locals to join the local police 
and militia forces. These forces, supported by the Coalition, successfully conducted 
offensive operations and the population quickly realized that it could reestablish security 
and control of its own province (U.S. Department of State, 2008).  
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2.  Operations in an Unconventional Environment 
Despite the potential rosy picture painted by the fall of communism, large states 
such as Russia and China do remain threats, and therefore the U.S. should maintain some 
conventional capability. For example, Russia’s conflict with Georgia in August 2008 
involved modern weapons, armored combat vehicles, and conventional battlefield tactics.  
However, the non-state actor threats require an unconventional or irregular 
approach, to which the U.S. is unaccustomed. As Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Robert 
M. Gates stated, “we must not be so preoccupied with preparing for future conventional 
and strategic conflicts that we neglect to provide both short-term and long-term all the 
capabilities necessary to fight and win conflicts such as we are in today” (Gates, 2008b). 
IW may not require the same degree of technology or conventional force; in fact, 
excessive force could be detrimental to the mission (Mack, 1975, p. 177). For example, 
the U.S. policy of emplacing large numbers of troops patrolling is questionable, as “a 
large foreign military presence or occupation force in any country undermines the 
legitimacy of the host-nation government in the eyes of its citizens and the international 
community” (G. Wilson, 2006, p. 3). 
One tactic to earn the trust of the population is the “soft,” multipronged approach, 
which avoids heavy conventional combat power that is ineffective against light guerilla 
and insurgent forces and alienates the local population. The U.S. implements this strategy 
by improving the “capacity of fragile or vulnerable partners to withstand internal threats 
and external aggression” (Gates, 2008a, p. 6). This element of establishing security and 
trust are among the most important aspects of IW. A government, community, or group 
that cannot protect its members and citizens quickly loses their trust and loyalty. Only 
can secure populations safely pursue their livelihoods and even consider issues such as 
democratic governance.  
However, the U.S. definition of security differs from that of the native population. 
The U.S. considers security “negative peace [or] the absence of armed conflict” (Donini, 
Minear, Smillie, van Baarda, & Welch, 2005, p. 16). This definition ignores the petty 
crime, theft, and corruption that takes place in the absence of development and jobs and 
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fails to address the root of the problem. In Afghanistan, for example, many in the local 
population equate security with employment and access to adequate services: “Peace is 
jobs and electricity” (Donini et al., 2005, p. 16). These two different visions result in a 
disconnect between the U.S.’ intentions and the population’s needs. The USG must 
implement and coordinate an integrated plan that will achieve a secure environment and 
meet the needs of the local population.  
In addition to security, “essential ingredients of long-term success include 
economic development, institution building, and the rule of law, as well as promoting 
internal reconciliation, good governance, providing basic services to the people, training 
and equipping indigenous military and police forces, [and] strategic communications,” all 
of which fall under the header of state capacity, as illustrated in Table 1, below (Gates, 
2008a, p. 17). Table 1 shows the aspects of state capacity that any community needs to be 
viable and the factors that influence them. In the current threat environment focusing on 
SO, personnel performing IW operations need to understand how to assess, create, 
sustain, and transfer the elements of state capacity to influence the outcome of conflicts 
or to establish security post-conflict. The influences and framing are key to developing 
capacities that will last long after the intervention ends. Influence drivers are those who 
are part of the conflict or actors (people who have ideas) and can be either positive or 
negative (Guttieri, 2008b, p. 13). 
In the absence of institutions that can provide services for citizens, alternative 
groups such as terrorist organizations, religious groups, or insurgents can and will occupy 
the gap. For example, in Lebanon, Hezbollah removed trash and provided families with 
money to rebuild their homes. The U.S. can play a key role in winning the “hearts and 
minds” of the local population and gain their trust by working with the local government 
or community to provide these services. This will placate the population and enhance the 


































Table 1.   Development Focus Areas (From Guttieri, 2008b, p. 13) 
Regardless of its positive intentions, many in the USG government continue to 
perpetuate “the U.S. strategy of promoting democracy and freedom in the Middle East as 
the antidote to terrorism” (Sageman, 2008, pp. 147-148). In an ideal democratic society, 
conflict channels through the political arena instead of the physical. The general USG 
perception is that a “liberal democracy is the legitimate form of government and that 
other forms of government are not only illegitimate but transitory” (Kagan, 2007, p. 19). 
To the contrary, several examples around the world support the idea that post-conflict or 
civil war areas, and in those with a very diverse population, immediate democratic 
elections may undermine peace and security. For example, Bosnia’s 1996 elections, held 
less than a year after the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995, reinforced ethnic 
divisions instead of facilitating cooperation (Paris, 2004, pp. 101-102). While the U.S. 
still supports and advocates democracy, policy-makers are beginning to realize that 
achieving democratic governance is a step-wise process, not a single step.  
As result, most of the U.S.’ current overseas deployments and missions have one 
primary goal: to enhance the legitimacy of the local governing structure and facilitate 
security and stability by garnering the support of the people and winning their “hearts and 
minds.” These latter operations are an integral part of the U.S.’ approach to stability 




peace (Mc Hugh & Gostelow, 2004, pp. 1-2). By avoiding actions and imposing values 
that incite the wrath and ire of the population, the U.S. may prevent the population from 
joining the terrorist social movement.  
The U.S. Army’s primary purpose used to be “to fight and win the nation’s wars.” 
The military’s primary mission was not conducting reconstruction operations. The 
current threat environment and operations in Iraq and Afghanistan resulted in a focus 
shift for the entire military, including the Army. Because of the military’s inexperience in 
these types of operations, NGOs and other USG agencies such as the State Department 
and USAID are key partners and assets. These organizations possess the experience, 
funds, contacts, and neutral affiliation (compared to the uniformed military) to conduct 
reconstruction operations. 
B. UNITED STATES POLICIES 
After 9/11, the USG scrambled to react to the new threat. Faced with an 
unfamiliar enemy and unprepared to find, fix, and locate the enemy, the USG hastily 
convened study groups, commissions, and reports whose goals were twofold: determine 
where U.S. national defense capabilities failed and evaluate possible solutions to those 
gaps. The doctrine and guidance that emerged reflect an overall trend focusing on the 
risks from ungoverned or weakly governed areas around the globe. By establishing 
security and control, the U.S. and its allies could prevent or locate hostile threats before 
they cause harm. Improving the quality of life, standard of living, and establishing 
responsive governance in these areas, would create a long-term trend that would last after 
the U.S.’ intervention. The following section analyzes some of the documents for 
relevance to civil affairs functions, and their ability to be executed. Policies are listed in 
order of developmental precedence as opposed to publication date. 
1. National Security Strategy 2002 
President Bush officially declared the Global War on Terror (GWOT) in the 
National Security Strategy (NSS) in 2002 (Bush, 2002). The 2002 NSS emphasizes the 
terrorist threat and the need for the U.S. to prevent and assist failed or failing states by 
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facilitating and rewarding democratic institutions, alleviating poverty, and increasing 
economic development (Bush, 2002, pp. 4-6).  
This document has several key shortcomings. First, the term “Global War on 
Terror” is a misnomer. One cannot wage war on “terror” or “terrorism.” These are 
fighting tactics. The GWOT label deceptively minimizes the number and non-state actor 
nature of the enemy and lumps them into one category. The second key shortfall is the 
emphasis on democracy as an essential vehicle to alleviate the world’s problems. While 
humanitarian assistance and economic development would facilitate security and 
strengthening of weak states’ structures, cultural differences and the ongoing politics 
within a nation-state may not be conducive to democracy and may worsen the situation 
(Paris, 2004).  
In addition, while the NSS lays out lofty, vaguely defined goals such as 
collaboration with key allies and political and economic freedom, these tasks are neither 
assigned to a specific agency for responsibility, nor are the methodology to achieve the 
goals outlined or defined (Dale, 2008, CRS-5). This was the first document to suggest a 
standing cadre of civilian personnel that the USG could call on to support these goals in 
future U.S. interventions. 
The U.S. engagements directly reflected these issues in both Afghanistan and 
Iraq. The U.S. military approach focused on conventional wartime solutions and a direct 
implementation of democratic elections, without considering the capacity of governing 
structures in these countries or the willingness and desire of the populations in these 
countries for democracy. In Iraq, for example, the U.S. failed to understand the non-state 
actor threat and destroyed what little government Iraq had through “de-Baathification,” 
alienating a substantial block of the population and forcing the U.S. to rebuild 
governance capacity from nothing. The confusion between the DOS and the DoD 
revealed the confusion among areas of responsibility and authority. 
The document had another significant impact. The GWOT is a significant shift 
from the prior administration’s view that terrorism was a “criminal matter” in the realm  
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of the Department of Justice (DOJ) (Scarborough, 2004, pp. 1-2). Viewing terrorism in 
militant terms expanded U.S. policy options to include the use of military forces 
(Scarborough, 2004, pp. 1-2).  
While the NSS does not specifically reference civil affairs, the types of economic, 
stability, and development operations to which President Bush refers are in the realm of 
CA personnel, especially in unstable regions of the world where foreign civilian worker 
and NGO presence is minimal. 
2. National Security Strategy 2006 
The 2006 NSS was as vague as its predecessor in 2002. Reflecting similar goals 
to the 2002 NSS, the 2006 NSS expanded on many of the 2002 goals. This document also 
failed to assign responsibility or accountability to specific agencies, and failed to 
prioritize the goals within the document. One key addition to the 2006 NSS was an 
introductory section listing “successes and challenges”; Iraq and Afghanistan were 
included as examples of “successful” replacement of tyrannies with democracies. 
3. National Defense Strategy 2005 
The NSS informs the National Defense Strategy (NDS), which in turn informs the 
national Military Strategy (NMS). The 2005 NDS “was notable for introducing a new, 
quadripartite categorization of global security challenges: “traditional,” “irregular,” 
“catastrophic,” or “disruptive” (Dale, 2008, CRS-8). This document was critical in the 
military’s updating its doctrine to reflect the current threat environment, exemplified by 
documents such as the IW-JOC. 
However, similar to the 2002 and 2006 NSS’, the NDS reiterates vague goals 
without assigning specific responsibilities for actions to the military’s branches. The 2005 
NDS does emphasize the military’s changing mission sets, including humanitarian 
assistance and law enforcement operations, and the need for accurate and timely 
intelligence (Rumsfeld, 2005, pp. 6 & 12). 
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4. National Defense Strategy 2008 
The 2008 NDS acknowledges the need for long-term activities, partnerships with 
a diverse array of players, and unconventional tactics (Gates, 2008a, p. 17). Importantly, 
the 2008 NDS recognizes that the DoD is currently performing many of these long-term 
reconstruction and development missions both because of the uncertain nature of the 
security environment in some areas, and also because the USG lacks a civilian force 
ready to deploy and tackle such missions.  
The 2008 NDS reinforces the NSS in stating that the USG should develop a 
greater, permanent civilian force from both the education field and industry. This force 
would alleviate the burden on military personnel and prevent unnecessary military 
involvement. The NDS, like the NSS, fails to address the source of funding or incentives 
necessary to establish such a force (Gates, 2008a, p. 17). However, the new Civilian 
Response Corps finally moved towards reality in July 2008, when Congress approved 
$75 million in funding to support recruitment and training of a cadre of civilian personnel 
willing to deploy on a few weeks’ notice, much like the military’s reserve forces (Wanke, 
2008). 
5.  Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 
Congress and the DoD responded to the GWOT and the changing global threat 
with DoD Directive (DoDD) 3000.05, published November 28, 2005. This document 
directs the Army to integrate stability operations (SOs) into its training in addition to 
conventional warfare with an emphasis as important as combat operations. Stability 
operations “advance U.S. interests and values” with the immediate goals to provide “the 
local populace with security, restore essential services, and meet humanitarian needs;” 
the long term goals include developing “indigenous capacity for securing essential 
services, a viable market economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil 
society” (Department of Defense, 2005, p. 2).  
While DoDD 3000.05 explicitly states that SOs are a “core U.S. military mission 
that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support,” it also 
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emphasizes the cooperative nature of the effort with international countries and militaries, 
NGOs, private companies, and other USG agencies (England, 2005, p. 2).  
DoDD 3000.05 notes that many SO tasks are “best performed by indigenous, 
foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals” but notes that the military should be prepared to 
execute these tasks when civilians cannot (Department of Defense, 2005, p. 2). This is a 
critical point; U.S. or foreign civilian and NGO assistance may not be readily available or 
willing based on the security and threat level in a given area, especially immediately after 
cessation of combat operations. In these types of situations and environments, the 
military’s CA capabilities would be one of the few alternatives. DoDD 3000.05 also fails 
to take into consideration that many other organizations within the USG are more 
doctrinally suited to SO missions9; the document assigns a dominant role to the military 
instead of what may be a more appropriate reinforcing role. 
One of the most recent results of this directive is the establishment of the 
Consortium for Complex Operations (CCO). DoDD 3000.05 directed the establishment 
of a Center of Excellence for Stability Operations. While the State Department is the lead 
on the CCO, the CCO is primarily funded by the DoD because DoDD 3000.05 failed to 
provide or to establish a source of funding to meet its intent. 
6. National Security Presidential Directive 44 
The title of National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44) is 
“Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization.” 
While this document places the Secretary of State (SOS) as the lead in all aspects of 
reconstruction operations, it does not provide a source of funding for the SOS to 
implement this capability (The White House, 2005).  
This document is relevant for several reasons. First, the document highlights the 
importance of reconstruction operations and the degree to which interagency cooperation 
                                                 
9 State Department and USAID describe their mission as “advance freedom for the benefit of the 
American people and the international community by helping to build and sustain a more democratic, 
secure, and prosperous world composed of well-governed states that respond to the needs of their people, 
reduce widespread poverty, and act responsibly within the international system” (U.S. Department of State 
& U.S. Agency for International Development, 2007, p. 2). 
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will be required for success. Second, by placing the Department of State (DOS) in charge 
of the development, integration, and practice of reconstruction and stabilization 
operations, NSPD-44 emphasizes the need for skills typically outside the DoD (The 
White House, 2005). This document, in conjunction with Department of Defense 
Directive 3000.05, directly supported the development of the 1207 Program, which 
authorized the DoD to send the DOS funds for security, reconstruction, and stabilization 
(Perito, 2008, p. 1). These monies served to “jump-start” the State Department’s Office 
of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (CRS) (Perito, 2008, p. 1).  
7. 2008 National Military Strategy 
The National Military Strategy (NMS) supports the NSS and implements the 
NDS. This most recent assessment fully takes into account the different current and 
emerging threats around the world. Published before Russia’s invasion into Georgia in 
August 2008, it accurately predicted Russia’s burgeoning hegemonic intentions. 
However, this document fails to outline a methodology by which the DoD will prepare 
for the new threats.  
8. 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review 
Based on the 2005 NDS, the 2006 QDR is the first developed with the U.S. 
actively at war. The 2006 QDR focuses on the IW threat and increasing the military’s 
capability to face and to address these threats using an indirect approach while retaining 
its ability to face conventional threats (Department of Defense, 2006, p. 11). This is the 
only document to quantify a change in force requirements in several areas, including 
SOF; the QDR delineates augmenting CA and Psychological Operations (PO) forces by 
3,700, an increase of 33% (Department of Defense, 2006, p. 45).  
This document had a significant impact in several ways. It was one of the first 
documents to emphasize the need for decision-making reform, and effectively 
implemented significant changes in the military’s force structure. Since the release of the 
2006 QDR, the Army successfully augmented the CA, PO, and SF, phasing the ultimate 
goal over several years (Lamb & Lachow, 2006, p. 1). 
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9. Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept 
The Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept (IW JOC) published in 2007 is 
one of the first comprehensive guides for U.S. IW military strategy, doctrine, and 
organization. This document emphasizes the long-term nature of involvement in IW, and 
the need for a “whole-of-government” (not just military) and people-oriented approach to 
IW threats: “IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the 
full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, 
influence, and will” (U.S. Special Operations Command & Marine Corps Combat 
Development Command, 2007, p. 6). 
The IW-JOC notes, among other risks, that “operating in an ambiguous IW 
environment will create new mental and physiological demands on personnel conducting 
long-term assignments in foreign austere settings” requiring operators to “exercise 
communicating, persuading, and negotiating skills using the members’ language 
proficiency, cultural knowledge, and cross-cultural communications skills” (U.S. Special 
Operations Command & Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 2007, p. 38).  
10. Field Manual 3-0: Operations 
While FM 3-0 is a significant improvement over the latest version published prior 
to 9-11 in June 2001, this manual still has significant shortfalls. FM 3-0 positively 
reflects importance of working in a joint military and interagency environment within and 
through local populations to affect change. However, it still reflects the Army’s concept 
of “full spectrum operations” (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2008a, p. vii). The 
operational continuum parallels the “spectrum of conflict,” and implies that the military 
can and should scale its operations according to the severity of the conflict (Headquarters, 





Figure 4.   The Spectrum of Conflict (From Headquarters, Department of the Army, 
2008a) 
This terminology and perspective are misleading. Figure 4 assumes that stable 
peace, unstable peace, insurgency, and general war are a direct progression of violence. 
Unstable peace may never escalate to insurgency or general war, but the diagram leads to 
the conclusion that the military needs to expend less resources to fight an insurgency than 
a general war, for example. The fallacy of this argument is that the same forces and the 
same skills can adapt to each situation, when different skills sets and equipment may be 
required at each level. This view is extremely limited in scope and fails to see military 
strategy as an adjunct to long-term political strategy. 
11. Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency Manual 
The new Counterinsurgency (COIN) manual, FM 3-24 (2006) is significant for its 
integration of lessons from past insurgencies and shortfalls. While the manual provides 
useful “how-to” tips at the operator level, such as pay and equipping considerations when 
establishing local and national security forces, the true importance of the manual is that it 
reflects an overall paradigm shift in the military and governmental approach to COIN and 
the shift from direct firepower and destruction to personal interaction with the local 
environment (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006a).  
This manual is augmented by a new draft COIN manual directed at government 
agencies other than the military, which emphasizes a concerted interagency approach to 
COIN operations (U.S. Government Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative, 2007, p. 
8). This formalizes the cooperative nature of conducting COIN operations by leveraging 
the capabilities and assets of the entire USG. 
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12. Field Manual 3-07: Stability Operations 
FM 3-07 builds on the foundation of FM 3-0 and FM 3-24, Stability Operations 
and Support Operations, and COIN, respectively. FM 3-07 is an integral step in the 
doctrinal development of SO. Critically, the FM recognizes that “contrary to popular 
belief, the military history of the United States is one characterized by stability 
operations, interrupted by distinct episodes of major combat” (Headquarters, Department 
of the Army, 2008b, p. 1-1). The FM describes a planning framework developed by an 
interagency group led by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) to focus planning 
efforts. 
This FM is especially useful because it provides a baseline and basis as well as 
specific recommended tasks to achieve the desired goals. Figure 6 illustrates the 
integration of SO tasks into the full spectrum operations described in FM 3-0. The FM is 
significant in that it emphasizes and describes operations coordinated in conjunction with 
interagency partners such as the DOS. 
 
Figure 5.   An integrated approach to stability operations (From Headquarters, 
Department of the Army, 2008b, p. 2-5) 
13. Policy Summary and Recommendations 
Table 2 summarizes the key findings of the policy analysis. Together, these 
policies reflect the USG’s strategy to combat terrorism and to prepare the DoD and DOS 
for the IW threat. As more time passed after 9/11 and because of the numerous studies 
and operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the USG adapted its strategy. The new strategy 
focuses on stability operations, with economic development, and establishing or restoring 
 28
essential services and infrastructure. The change in focus has significant impact for those 
in the USG who conduct these types of operations, including CA officers. Organizing 
economic development efforts across a country or a province requires advanced 
education, coordination with agencies foreign and domestic, cultural awareness, and 
language capabilities.  
 
  Policy Year Primary Objective Civil Affairs Implications 
1 National Security Strategy 
(NSS) 
2002 Declaration of GWOT Emphasis on democracy as vehicle for preventing 
terrorism 
2 National Security Strategy 
(NSS) 
2006 Reiterate U.S. role as world leader in 
alleviating and preventing conflict 
Methodology? Responsible agencies not identified 
3 National Defense Strategy 
(NDS) 
2005 Officially introduced new terminology 
to military lexicon 
No designation of priorities or responsibilities 
4 National Defense Strategy 
(NDS) 
2008 Economic development, FID, create 
deployable civilian force 
Initial lack of funding and incentives; Civilian 
Corps recruitment initiated July 08 
5 National Security 
Presidential Directive 44 
(NSPD-44) 
2005 Interagency cooperation vital to R & S No funding source to implement; financial support 
from DoD via 1207 Program 
6 National Military Strategy 2008 Adapt to new threats but retain some 
conventional capability 
Long term plan to support both UW and 
conventional needs? 
7 Quadrennial Defense 
Review 
2006 Focus on IW threat Increased force sizes for SOF, including CA 
8 Department of Defense 
Directive 3000.05 
2005 Elevates SOs to core DoD mission; 
establish center of excellence 
Military CA recommended for insecure areas, CCO 
created 
9 Irregular Warfare Joint 
Operating Concept 
2007 Acknowledges need to consider civilian 
population 
Need for different skill set; adjust future military 
training and focus 
10 Field Manual 3.0 2008 Increased emphasis on joint and 
interagency 
Assumes same force can conduct all missions 
11 COIN Manual 2006 Fills doctrinal gap, update lessons 
learned 
Provides basic guidelines, emphasizes need for IA 
and situational assessments 
12 Stability Operations Manual 2008 Fills doctrinal gap, update lessons 
learned 
Provides detailed framework, emphasizes need for 
IA, time, and careful assessments 
Table 2.   Key United States Policy and Doctrine and Implications for Civil Affairs  
New field manuals, training courses, and military policies integrate many of the 
lessons learned from Afghanistan and Iraq and the language of COIN and SO. The new 
COIN FM and addition of these concepts to military schools are examples. The military 
is adapting in other ways, as well. For example, both the Army and the Marine Corps 
disseminated public statements that officers serving on a Military Transition Team10 or 
                                                 
10 A Military Transition Team (MTT) is a group of military personnel assigned to assist a foreign unit 
in developing its skills, tactics, and unit cohesion to operate independently successfully eventually. 
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PRTs learn skills critical for the services’ future and that these billets are equally 
competitive as other “key and developmental”11 assignments when officers are assessed 
for promotion (Johnson, 2008; Lopez, 2008). This illustrates that the USG and its 
agencies understand that they must change and adapt to ensure that the U.S. is ready to 
fight or to prevent the next fight, wherever and whenever that may be.  
Future policy and doctrine need to integrate the “five Ws”: who, what, where, 
when, why, and how. Current documents lack the means to force change throughout the 
USG, especially those directed at the DoD and DOS. Without funds, controls, or 
incentives to support organizational changes, authorities, and a strong lead organization 
synchronizing efforts, new doctrine and policy are merely words on a piece of paper. 
Without a clear purpose and intent that both Congress and the Executive Branch 
understand, change will be slow, and potentially ineffective. To force rapid change, 
Congressional buy-in and legislation must support Presidential directives; only through a 
coordinated effort will USG agencies alter their focus and the way they conduct 
operations. (J. Q. Wilson, 1989) 
C. CONCLUSION: THE CIVIL AFFAIRS CAPABILITY DEMAND 
The military’s CA officers play a key role in both the current and future threat 
environment. All current events and historical markers point to non-state actors, failed 
states, and trans-national terrorists as the current threat and that of the foreseeable future. 
The U.S. views its role as both a peacekeeper and a tool to effect change in nations and 
areas struggling to handle these threats. Based on recent USG policy and doctrine, 
peacekeeping, SO, and CI operations are the U.S.’ tools of choice to support and enhance 
the capabilities and legitimacy of areas facing these problems. CA operations play an 
integrated role in campaign plans designed to reduce support for the enemy by positively 
influencing different population segments. 
These diverse requirements require an equally diverse set of skills for CA officers 
to operate successfully in varied environments. CA forces must work closely with the 
                                                 
11 “Key and Developmental (KD)” assignments are those listed in AR 600-3 that an Army officer must 
complete prior to consideration for promotion to the next grade.  
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local population and local governing structures to evaluate and determine priorities and 
therefore must have an in-depth cultural and linguistic capability to ensure positive 
relations and clear understanding of goals and intent. The goal is to meet the needs of the 
assisted society, not to impose U.S. values: “It will…require the U.S. to develop a more 
profound understanding of the basic religious and philosophical assumptions underlying 
other civilizations and the ways in which people in those civilizations see their interests” 
(Huntington, 1993, p. 49). Regardless of exact implementation, “the nature of current 
missions in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere requires military officers to appreciate the 
nuances of national policy and work closely with civilian officials, other militaries, and 
civilians from intergovernmental and non governmental agencies” (Guttieri, 2006, pp. 
340-341).  
Evaluating the skills required in the current threat environment and stability tasks 
such as those in Figure 5 leads to Table 3, which highlights some of the key tasks and 
skills that CA officers will need in this current and future threat environment. 
 
Understand and integrate information operations 
Assess and implement plans to support 
environmental security 
Assess and implement plans to support global 
health concerns and issues 
Operate in complex environments 
Conduct and coordinate stability operations 
Conduct and coordinate humanitarian assistance / 
disaster relief 
Conduct and coordinate prevention operations 
Conduct negotiations and develop consensus 
Form hasty networks 
Support conventional force operations 
Integrate plans into cultural environment 
Long term economic development 
Table 3.   CA Skills and Tasks Needed for the Current and Future Threat  
(After Guttieri, 2008b) 
The U.S. will not relinquish its dominant role in the world anytime soon. To the 
contrary, countries around the world are content to let the U.S. serve as the world’s 
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peacekeeper, ensuring security both on the water and on the ground, and expect the U.S. 
to intervene around the world at the first hint of a conflict that could impact the world’s 
economic security and well-being (Kagan, 2007). 
As with many of the other areas of the military, many of the roles and jobs CA 
personnel currently perform differ from those in the past, while others are similar to prior 
conflicts. The USG uses CA officers for a variety of functions at all levels of the military 
hierarchy, where they act as planners, coordinators, and liaisons with host nation 
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III. CIVIL AFFAIRS EDUCATION AND PRACTICE 
Chapter II illustrated that the military’s mission in the near future will include 
irregular warfare. These missions will require more engagement on the civil dimension, 
increasing the relevance of Civil Affairs roles as described in Chapter I. This chapter 
focuses on Civil Affairs educational pipeline and current operational practices. Each step 
in an officer’s career path should prepare him or her for the next level of responsibility 
and the next mission.  
One of the greatest challenges that the military faces is the multitude of missions 
assigned to it. Conventional warfare and IW require much different skills sets and 
knowledge. While the military acknowledges the importance of IW, many leaders are 
reluctant to focus on IW, for several reasons:  
1) Integrating or changing existing curricula will divert attention from 
conventional warfare, and if these skills atrophy, then the military may be caught 
unprepared (Tyson, 2008). 
2)   Most of the military’s current senior leaders emerged in a conventional 
environment focused on heavy, technology-driven combat power; they are uncomfortable 
and unfamiliar with much of the terminology, practice, and application of IW to the 
modern battlefield. 
3)   The U.S. is severely risk averse. The military tends to focus on technology 
versus tactics to reduce the need to place personnel in jeopardy. For example, instead of 
emphasizing language and cultural awareness for human intelligence collection, the U.S. 
approach was to focus on remote collection capabilities such as satellites and listening 
devices (O’Connell, 1997). While this technology provides useful data on large troop and 
equipment movements, such as during the Cold War, this technology is not nearly as 
effective in remote jungles or in cities where the enemy and the population look the same. 
Another example of risk aversion is the focus on armored vehicles and remote missile 
delivery systems. This technology physically separates the war fighter from both the  
 
 34
enemy and the population. The result may be fewer U.S. casualties, but more innocent 
civilian deaths and property destruction, which can ultimately sabotage U.S. efforts to 
combat an insurgency. 
Even with supporting reports as early as 2004 stating “The service secretaries and 
Joint Chiefs of Staff should integrate stabilization and reconstruction operations into the 
services’ professional military education programs,” the military is reluctant to accept 
DoDD 3000.05 assigning SO the same importance as combat operations (Defense 
Science Board, 2004, p. vii). 
The key to overcoming the self-imposed limitations on the U.S. military is to 
effectively train and utilize organic IW capabilities such as CA. The majority of CA 
officers are in the U.S. Army. This chapter explores the Army’s common officer 
educational pipeline, and then focus on CA specific education. The goal of this chapter is 
to determine what skills and knowledge CA officers learn throughout their careers. 
Chapter IV will compare the results of this chapter with the demand gap from Chapter II 
to assess what, if any, shortfalls exist in the CA officer educational pipeline. 
A. THE ARMY’S PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION PIPELINE 
 The Army educates its officers through three methods: institutional training12, 
operational assignments, and self-development13. Education is distinct from training in 
that “Education implies the transmission of knowledge and skills required for 
effectiveness, as opposed to training “to perform specific functions, tasks, or missions” 
(Guttieri, 2006, pp. 318-319). However, both are essential for to develop a professional 
military officer capable of making informed and reasonable decisions to support a 
commander’s intent. 
The Army first focuses on a common core to inculcate its officers with certain 
knowledge and skills, and then diversifies within specific branches. Some of the skills 
and knowledge may apply to any military situation, such as leadership and problem 
solving. Other skills, such as tactics and branch-specific technical skills, may apply only 
                                                 
12 Institutional training takes place in military and/or civilian institutions. 
13 Self-development may be through distance learning, professional reading, or individual study. 
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to specific career fields. This section focuses on the knowledge and skills imparted 
throughout the educational pipeline through which all officers must travel.  
The Professional Military Education (PME) requirements for all Army officers 
are similar throughout the branches. PME focuses on the basic skills, characteristics, and 
knowledge that all Army officers need. PME is also oriented at problem solving skills to 
create flexible and adaptable leaders who can react to changes and make decisions with 
limited information. (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2007, p. 22)  
1. Basic Officer Leadership Course  
Currently, all newly commissioned Army lieutenants in all branches attend a 
common course focusing on weapons proficiency, tactics, and convoys, called the Basic 
Officer Leadership Course II (BOLC). Subsequently, each accession14 Army branch has 
its own junior officer instruction course called BOLIC III, which highlights branch-
specific knowledge and skills (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2007, p. 24). 
BOLC serves two very critical functions for junior officers. First, it establishes a 
baseline of knowledge, which the Army expects all new lieutenants to have. Second, it 
introduces junior leaders to basic Army operations, including organization, tactics, and 
doctrine. At this stage of development, the Army expects junior officers to receive 
mentorship and development within their units from both their experienced senior 
noncommissioned officers and senior officers.   
2. Captain’s Career Course 
The next step in the educational pipeline is the Captain’s Career Course (CCC). 
Like BOLIC, the CCC is aimed at junior officers. The CCC prepares junior leaders to 
command at the company, battery, or troop level and to perform as staff officers at the 
battalion and brigade level. Reserve officers can complete CCC training in one of two 
ways: by attending the active duty CCC, or by attending a Reserve CCC “which consists 
                                                 
14 An “accession” branch in one to which the Army can assign a newly commissioned lieutenant, other 
branches, such as CA, Psyops, and SF, select personnel from other branches at later points in an officer’s 
career. 
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of two, two-week ADTs (Active Duty for Training) spaced one year apart, plus up to 295 
hours of advanced distributed learning” (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2007, p. 
24). 
A recent change to the CCC is the addition of a distance learning Phase I 
Captains' Career Common Core Course (C5) designed to “provide a series of critical 
skills grounded in leadership, communication, composite risk management, critical 
reasoning/thinking and developing a positive command climate” (Army News Service, 
2007). While the Army introduced this change in 2007, the C5 fails to reflect many of the 
shortfalls or lessons learned indicated by current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Table 4 shows the current tasks required. Only two of the tasks listed in Table 4, numbers 
05 and 19, significantly emphasize operations in foreign theaters.  
 
Task Title Time 
02 - Conduct a change of primary hand receipt holder 
inventory 
2.00 
04 - Supervise the implementation of the Composite Risk 
Management process at company level 
2.30 
05 - Enforce company compliance with the host nation, 
federal state and local environmental laws and regulations 
2.60 
06 - Supervise the implementation of the Army's drug 
abuse prevention/control program 
5.00 
12 - Establish a positive command climate 4.70 
13 - Identify the legal implications of the homosexual 
conduct policy 
1.00 
18 - Manage a unit counseling program 4.50 
19 - Implement measures to reduce operational stress 3.00 
Total Time 25.10 
Table 4.   C5 Tasks and Time to Complete (From Institutional Leader Development 
Division, 2008) 
While each CCC teaches some branch specific skills, most of the CCCs 
emphasize class room instruction utilizing PowerPoint slides. Some CCCs incorporate in-
class exercises and presentations, but field time is rare. Each CCC culminates in a 
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combined arms exercise15 (CAX), but given that each CCC is branch or area specific, the 
“combined” aspect is minimal (Institutional Leader Development Division, 2007). For 
example, the signal CCC has only signal officers, so the exercise lacks input from the 
other military branches and will focus on the signal area of support and operations. This 
is a critical shortfall; many officers feel inadequately prepared to operate and interact 
within a battalion or brigade staff (R. Lewis, personal communication, October 9, 2008; 
M. Metzger, personal communication, October 9, 2008; F. Smith, personal 
communication, October 6, 2008). Because other branches, especially combat arms, 
rarely interact with the smaller, specialized branches such as CA, combat arms officers 
may fail to appreciate their utility to an operation.   
3. Intermediate Level Education 
a. Active Duty 
The next phase of the educational pipeline is Intermediate Level Education 
(ILE), which senior captains and majors attend. ILE consists of two phases. The first is a 
three month phase of Army common core (CC) knowledge and doctrine, while the 
second phase is a seven month course called the Advanced Operations and Warfighting 
Course (AOWC). This Master’s level course develops officers’ “abilities to conduct full 
spectrum operations in joint, multinational, and interagency environments; and to develop 
the requisite competencies to serve successfully as staff officers at division level and 
above” (Bralley, Danley, French, Soby, & Tiberi, 2003). ILE is focused on teaching 
students “how (versus what) to think, problem solving and decision-making,” to facilitate 
their future “service at division, corps, echelons above corps (EAC), land component 
command (LCC), and joint staffs” (Bralley et al., 2003). All Army officers must 
complete the common core, but only select branches (of which CA is one) must complete 
the entire ten month block. 
                                                 
15 The Army used to send all officers to Combined Arms Staff Course (CASQ), but eliminated this 
CCC follow-on course because of the costs. 
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The curriculum developers recently integrated Stability Operations into 
the CC and AOWC curriculums because of DoDD 3000.05. AOWC emphasizes stability 
operations into its three capstone exercises built around potential real-world scenarios, all 
integrating stability operations at the joint, division, and brigade levels (D. Clark, 
personal communication, November 19, 2008). The developers constantly update and 
revise the curriculum based on DA guidance, student feedback, and current operations. 
While significant changes and revisions can take six months to integrate, developers can 
integrate minor changes within 48 hours (D. Clark, personal communication, November 
19, 2008). 
b.  Reserve 
The Reserve side of the military has the option of attending ILE either in 
residence or via distance learning or education (DE)16. The reservist has a choice of two 
different versions of the nonresident version of the course. The student takes the “S” 
format course online, with periodic written requirements administered through the 
Command and General Staff College Department of Distance Education (DDE) (U.S. 
Army Human Resources Command, 2007). The second option is the “M” format of the 
course; The Army School System (TASS17) training battalions administer the course at 
remote locations around the world. This version of the course involves some DE and 
advance preparation in addition to the on-site training (U.S. Army Human Resources 
Command, 2007). 
Both of these options have drawbacks. Many students complain about 
DE’s quality and effectiveness, especially courses conducted completely online without 
any human interaction or feedback. Some Reserve units may favor distance education, 
however; because DE is free, and resident or TASS courses cost the unit both travel and 
fees to attend the course (J. Owens, personal communication, October 30, 2008). TASS 
courses also have several potential shortfalls. If students do not receive the study 
                                                 
16 Active duty personnel may complete ILE through distance learning only by exception. 
17 TASS battalions primarily train Reserve and National Guard personnel. 
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materials in advance18, they cannot prepare for the course and may not fully benefit from 
the class time. The regional TASS may have to cancel classes because of a lack of 
enrolled students or qualified instructors.  
In addition, the DE and TASS courses cannot match the resident course 
because remote locations lack access to the exercise systems; straight DE lacks the 
advantage of group and team interactions. This problem may improve in the near future, 
as CGSC is creating a blended campus that will combine asynchronous and synchronous 
DE with on-site time (D. Clark, personal communication, November 19, 2008). 
The ILE CC is required for promotion to LTC, while both CC and AOWC 
are required for promotion to COL (U.S. Army Human Resources Command, 2007). 
Many Reserve officers reach their 20-year retirement point at the grade of major, and 
may therefore have little incentive or initiative to complete ILE if they intend to retire 
before consideration to LTC and COL (G. Woodson, personal communication, October 
18, 2008). 
Though all majors are technically required to complete ILE, neither the 
reserve units nor the RC CA career manager enforces prompt ILE attendance upon 
promotion to major (K. Brown, personal communication, October 9, 2008; J.K. Owens, 
personal communication, October 30, 2008; G. Woodson, personal communication, 
October 18, 2008). This may be a serious issue because RC majors are in demand more 
than ever before to support conflicts around the world. If both the CC and AWOC teach 
critical staff and decision-making skills, then not completing these courses in advance of 
deploying may hinder the functionality and utility of RC CA officers. 
4. Senior Service College (SSC) 
The military offers several schools for its senior officers to prepare them for 
command and leadership in strategic and joint positions (Headquarters, Department of the 
                                                 
18 The student may be unprepared because he was enrolled in the course late, leaving insufficient time 
to receive and process the materials; his unit fail receive the materials from the school but not get them to 
the student on time; or the unit may fail to supervise the student, not ensuring that he is qualified with the 
prerequisite skills needed for the course, or failed to enforce standards on the student. 
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Army, 2007, p. 9). Selected military officers can attend the Army War College, Air War 
College or apply for fellowships to attend programs at over 13 different accredited and 
approved institutions ("Senior leader development: growing strategic leaders for the 21st 
century," 2008).  
B. CIVIL AFFAIRS EDUCATION AND DOCTRINE 




Figure 6.   Civil Affairs Officer Continuum (After Guttieri, 2008b, p. 11) 
1. Formal Military Education 
The Civil Affairs branch is a non-accession branch, so its officers come from 
other branches as senior lieutenants or captains instead of commissioning directly as CA 
officers. Serving in the conventional Army branches provides CA officers with small unit 
leadership experience and familiarization with conventional Army tactics and methods 
(Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2007, p. 181). 
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The Army expects its CA officers to complete their basic branch CCC, located at 
the branches’ home stations throughout the U.S. All CA officers attend the CA 
qualification course (CAQC), designed to teach “the necessary skills and technical 
qualifications to perform the duties required” (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 
2007, p. 23). The CA qualification course covers specific regional and cultural 
information, branch-specific skills, and language training, as illustrated in Figure 7. Table 
5 details the CA core tasks instructed during the CAQC. The U.S. Army’s John F. 
Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USASWC) is the primary proponent of CA 
doctrine and teaches the active duty CAQC.  
Appendix D lists the classes instructed during the CAQC; the CA proponent at 
SWC would not release the specific program of instruction (POI) details. The classes 
consist mostly of tactical CA skills for the company grade CA officer and do not address 
the operational or strategic levels of CA operations. 
The Advanced Regional Analysis Course teaches CA officers how to analyze 
their operational environment by collecting and managing key data “through instruction 
in the nonlethal targeting process, effects-based planning and the system-of-systems 
approach, which includes all elements of national power, i.e., diplomatic, informational, 
military and economic. The training also introduces officers to net-centric warfare, civil-
information management and ‘interagency awareness’ and training” to support the 
requirements of DoDD 3000.05 and DoD Directive 5100.46, Foreign Disaster Relief 
(Myskey, 2007, p. 31). This is a significant step in achieving the goal of integrated Civil 
Information Management (CIM).  
Because USACAPOC controls and manages the Army’s Reserve forces, Reserve 
CA personnel attend a separate CA course, USAR CA Officer Course, as shown in 
Figure 8 (Burton, 2008, p. 8). The 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group 
(Airborne) (3rd Bn, 1st SWTG) conducts the Reserve CAQC. The Reserve CA course 





Figure 7.   Active Duty Civil Affairs Qualification Course (From Secretary General Staff, 
2007) 
The 1st Training Brigade conducts the predeployment training for all activated 
Reserve CA personnel preparing to deploy (J. Owens, personal communication, October 
30, 2008). While the 1st Training Brigade’s personnel are trained and certified to instruct 
and use the curricula and materials SWC developed, the 1st Training Brigade is 
composed primarily of infantry personnel who rarely have CA backgrounds or 
experience, which may be that case with many individual augmentees19 (J. Owens, 
personal communication, October 30, 2008). Prior experience of instructors in an area of 
instruction contributes to instructor credibility and effectiveness, especially when many 
individual augmentees lack any other CA training or experience. 
The active duty and Reserve courses intersect in the final phase of both courses, 
for the field exercise (FTX) called “Operation Certain Trust” (Burton, 2008, p. 10). This 
FTX integrates real-world scenarios with the CA officers’ new knowledge and skills from 
                                                 
19 Individual augmentees are reserve military personnel who may not belong to a unit but because of 
operational requirements or personnel shortfalls are recalled to Active duty and deployed with or to join an 
existing unit. 
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the CAQC (Burton, 2008, p. 10). While the CAQC curriculum is constantly under 
revision, CA officers who completed the course as recently as 2003 observed that the 
scenarios were very scripted and simplistic, focusing more on operations in Bosnia than 
more recent operational experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan (R. Lewis, personal 
communication, October 9, 2008). The scenarios portrayed CA officers’ role in theater as 
conducting jobs that leaders could not logically assign to another proponent, leaving the 
new CA officers without a clear idea of their role during deployments (R. Lewis, personal 
communication, October 9, 2008; M. Metzger, personal communication, October 9, 
2008). Training was also less effective because it was a CA-pure exercise and did not 
involve any other forces but CA. Performing CA functions out of context with other 
military forces fails to reinforce many of the CA core tasks, especially those that involve 














Table 5.   Civil Affairs Officer Core Tasks and Skills (Lieutenant and Captain) (From 
Secretary General Staff, 2007) 
While the military bureaucracy takes time to process and integrate lessons 
learned, USG policy and doctrine post 9/11 emphasized the importance and utility of CA 
forces to furthering the U.S.’ foreign policy goals. To support these ends, the CAQC 
needs to constantly adapt and update its curriculum. With the high demand on Reserve 
CA officers and their overlapping responsibilities with active duty CA officers, SWC 
should ensure that the Reserve and Active duty curriculums are closely connected. 
Civil Information Management 
Civil Reconnaissance 
Support to Civil Administration 
Nation Assistance 
Military Civic Action 
Foreign Humanitarian Assistance 
Populace and Resources Control 
Dislocated Civilian Operations 
Noncombatant Evacuation Operations 
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Figure 8.   Reserve Civil Affairs Officer Training Course (From Burton, 2008, p. 9) 
2. Optional Education 
The military affords many military officers the opportunity to attend a graduate 
level program to earn a Master’s degree in a field that will support or enhance military 
capability and support the higher educational goals of its outstanding officers. The Army 
calls this program “Advanced Civil Schooling20 (ACS)” (Headquarters, Department of 
the Army, 2007, pp. 27-28).  
The Army’s Special Operations Command (SOCOM), the organization that 
controls all Army CA personnel, affords many of its members the opportunity to attend a 
fully funded graduate education program at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). 
SOCOM sponsors and provides significant funding for the NPS Defense Analysis (DA) 
program.  
 
                                                 
20 Programs typically last one year and up to 18 months. The officer incurs an active duty service 
obligation (ADSO); the officer must remain on active duty for a specified period following degree 
completion, and the assignment manager may place the officer in a specific assignment to take advantage 
of his/her new knowledge. 
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Educational Skill Requirements for DA Program at NPS 
Strategy and Policy 
The Dynamics of Inter-State and Intra-State Conflict 
Terrorism, Social Revolution, and Unconventional Warfare 
Historical and Comparative Perspectives on Special Operations 
Special Operations Doctrine, Concepts, and Institutions 
Crisis Management and the Contingent Use of Military Power 
Comparative Cases of and Responses to Regional Conflict 
Special Operations and the Revolution in Military Affairs 
Special Operations and Information Warfare 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Proliferation and Counter-Proliferation 
Analytical Methods and Applications 
Strategic and Operational Complexity 
Table 6.   Educational Skill Requirements for Defense Analysis Program at NPS (From 
"Naval Postgraduate School General Catalog," 2008) 
The Special Operations/Irregular Warfare curriculum21 has a track designed for 
CA officers called “National Security Affairs (Stability/Reconstruction)” ("Naval 
Postgraduate School General Catalog," 2008). Graduates earn a Master’s of Science in 
Defense Analysis, designated with the National Security Affairs 
(Stability/Reconstruction) specialty track22. Earning a degree at NPS alleviates a CA 
officer of the requirement to complete the seven-month phase of ILE. NPS is one of 
many schooling opportunities, and the Defense Analysis department in the only one with 
a curriculum that specializes in Special Operations.  
ACS is an outstanding opportunity for any Civil Affairs officer to both increase 
knowledge and hone analytical skills. Unfortunately, few active duty and even fewer 
Reserve CA officers receive any advanced civil schooling.  
                                                 
21 According to the NPS catalog, the “Special Operations/Irregular Warfare curriculum provides a 
focused course of instruction in irregular warfare, sub-state conflict, terrorism and counterterrorism, and 
other "high leverage" operations in U.S. defense and foreign policy. The core program also provides every 
student with a strong background in strategic analysis, decision modeling, organization theory, and formal 
analytical methods” ("Naval Postgraduate School General Catalog," 2008)  
22 While the NSA Stability Reconstruction Track is designed for CA officers, CA officers attending 
NPS are not mandated to complete this particular curriculum. The Defense Analysis Department offers 
several other concentrations. 
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3.  Civil Affairs Functional Specialists 
The formal CA educational pipeline does not provide education for functional 
specialists.23 Functional specialists, found only in the USAR, theoretically acquire their 
skills through their civilian jobs or through self-development (Headquarters, Department 
of the Army, 2006b). The SWC or other institutions do not provide additional training to 
CA personnel to qualify or develop them as functional specialists. 
4.  Civil Affairs Doctrine 
Civil Affairs doctrine is evolving rapidly and the USASWC personnel routinely 
seek feedback to improve manuals and bring them in line with current operations. Many 
of the most relevant documents reflect current operations and the expanded application of 
CA to operations around the world and across the spectrum of operations. 
a.  JP 3-57 Civil-Military Operations Jul 2008         
The most recent version of the Joint CMO manual stresses the essential 
integration of CMO at all levels of planning and execution. Figure 9 shows a phasing 
model of a typical operation. While CMO is a consideration during phases 0-III, CMO 
play a critical role in phase IV and V, during which U.S. forces prepare to depart and 
must successfully shift authority to the appropriate civil authorities (Office of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, 2008b, p. I-8). 
This one of the first documents to assign the State Department’s 
Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (CRS) with the lead in reconstruction 
and stabilization operations (Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008b, p. I-7). In 
addition, the guide clarifies staff and commander responsibilities in CA areas. This is a 
tremendous improvement over previous doctrine in which CA were not well integrated 
with combat operations and were considered independent instead of supporting forces. 
 
                                                 
23 The Army qualifies medical and legal personnel as CA assets, but a different branches and 
proponents manage them. 
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Figure 9.   Phasing Model (From Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008b, p. I-8) 
b.  FM 3-05.40 Civil Affairs Operations Sep 2006     
FM 3-05.40 is one of the most important of the CA doctrinal manuals. 
This FM delineates specific roles and responsibilities for CA personnel at every 
operational level and within each organization. One of the key aspects of this FM is the 
distinction is the expectations and responsibilities at the tactical versus the operational 
and strategic level. The CA branch assigns most of the tactical roles leading CATs or 
managing CMOCs to CA captains. Branch usually assigns CA field grade officers to 
higher level staff positions, which require a different skill set and knowledge. 
The FM provides clearly utilized AARs and lessons learned from previous 
operations to highlight essential skills. For example, one of the most recent additions to 
the CA toolset is Civil Information Management (CIM). During OIF, CA personnel 
clearly indentified this area as a shortfall (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006b, 
p. 3-18). This FM provides a wealth of information for the CA manager to plan, conduct, 
and explain CA operations. 
The major shortfall with this FM is the failure to distinguish between the 
tactical, operational, and strategic levels of CA. The FM has some information and 
references to different organizational echelons operating at the different levels, but never 
explains the distinction in conduct, intent, and execution at the different levels. One of 
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the greatest current CA operational shortfalls is the constant emphasis on tactical CA 
versus the operational and strategic. This FM does not contribute to correcting that 
problem. 
c.  FM 3-05.401 Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques and Procedures 
Jul 2007 
This FM provides detailed information on conducting CA assessments and 
the developing plans and provides the tools and the “how-to” to conduct CA operations, 
but is not a step by step guide. This distinction is extremely important. Each environment 
in which CA forces operate is unique and distinct and each situation will be different. The 
framework and planning tools that this FM provides form a strong basis from which CA 
officers can work, especially when they need to justify or explain their suggestions and 
recommendations to leaders inexperienced in dealing with CA forces and operations.  
The FM clearly describes the various factors to consider when conducting 
the assessment or developing the CA annex are informational and clear. This will 
significantly aid inexperienced CA practitioners. This FM also clarifies the different CA 
levels, explaining tactical, operational, and strategic considerations and sample objectives 
at each level.  
The appendices to the FM detail many of the supporting tasks that CA 
officers need to perform, including using interpreters, negotiation and mediation, and 
financial and project management, among other key topics. FM 3-05.40 noted many of 
these topics as operational shortfalls from AARs and other feedback from the field.  
d. Summary 
The newest CA doctrine increasingly reflects current operational 
requirements as well as the future threat environment. According to the SWC CA 
doctrine proponent, many of the outdated manuals are currently in the process of 
revision. Even recently revised publications are still subject to feedback and review. The 
CA Foreign Assistance Planning Guide, for example, though published in 2005, is 
scheduled for review and updates starting in 2008. Table 7 summarizes some of the 
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recent key and significant CA doctrine available today. A notable exception to the 
currency of these publications is the Officer Foundation Standards II CA Officer’s 
Manual dated 2004. The manual defines the skills encompassed in the book as those key 
tasks instructed at CAQC. Much of the feedback from current CA officers indicates that 
the CA core tasks need revision and updating to correspond with current operational 
requirements. 
Manual Year Purpose Comments
1 JP 3-57 Civil-Military Operations    2008
Essential integration of CMO at all levels of 
planning and execution
One of the first documents to assign the DOS’ 
CRS with the lead in reconstruction and 
stabilization operations 
2 FM 3-05.40 Civil Affairs Operations 2006
Distinction is expectation and responsibilities at 
the tactical versus the operational and strategic 
levels
Utilized AARs and lessons learned from previous 
operations; added core task of Civil Information 
Management (CIM)
3
FM 3-05.401 Civil Affairs Tactics,
Techniques and Procedures 2007
How to conduct CA assessments and develop 
plans
Clarifies tactical, operational, and strategic 
considerations 
4
GTA 41-01-001 Civil Affairs Planning
And Execution Guide8 2008
Multifunctional guide that encompasses 
common soldier and staff officer tasks and 
information
Miniature version of the one-stop guide to “how 
to be a CA person”
5
GTA 41-01-003 Civil Affairs Foreign
Humanitarian Assistance Planning Guide 2005
Contingency of a natural disaster or other man-
made occurrence that leads to an urgent 
requirement to assist a population
Assists a CA operator to rapidly switch from one 
type of mission to another without having to 
conduct significant research
6
GTA 41-01-004 Joint Civil Affairs
Operations And Joint Civil-Military
Operations Planning Guide 2007
Assist those conducting CA and CMO in a joint 
environment
Planning considering and joint staff expectations 
of CA personnel
7
STP 41-38II-OFS Officer Foundation
Standards II Civil Affairs (38) Officer’s
Manual     2004
Critical company grade officer skills first trained 
in CAQC
Does not incorporate guerilla warfare, hearts and 
minds, purpose of CA actions
 
Table 7.   Current CA Doctrine and Publications 
C. TACTICAL CIVIL AFFAIRS 
One of the best means of education is on-the-job training (OJT). As many military 
officers will attest, classroom learning and knowledge application are often completely 
different. This is especially true of officers entering a new career field. As previously 
mentioned, CA is a non-accession branch. Unless an officer has civilian experience, 
worked with CA while deployed, or served as an enlisted CA soldier, a new CA officer 
has little experience with CA operations. While the CAQC does incorporate a CA field 
exercise, seeing CA out of the context of other staff members and military elements 
minimizes the utility of the field exercises and fails to teach CA officers their roles and 
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responsibilities effectively. As a result, until they deploy, many new CA officers lack a 
true appreciation of their roles and functions and learn by doing. 
1. Civil Affairs Teams Supporting Battalions and Brigades 
The first job of most junior CA officers is a CA tactical team leader. CATs 
operate primarily at the tactical level, which, as described in Chapter I, focuses on 
immediate needs such as food, water, and shelter, then on strengthening or improving 
local services and infrastructure to support and enhance the legitimacy of local governing 
structures and other elements of state capacity as shown in Table 3 in Chapter II. 
Activities include digging wells, and constructing or rebuilding bridges, schools, or 
medical facilities.  
Most the Civil Affairs personnel deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan were and are 
employed as tactical CA. Their primary focus is small projects that garner positive 
publicity and earn support for the Coalition forces. Teams assist local civilian 
governments, IGOs, and NGOs to meet the population’s immediate needs, and lessen the 
impact of military operations while enhancing self-sufficiency (Meares, 2008, p. 8). 
CATs must work closely with local leaders to address the needs and wants of the 
local population. Ideally, the projects CA officers facilitate should be “a locally generated 
concept executed by local workers and partially funded by the civil affairs team to give 
the population a sense of ownership” and to improve self-sufficiency (Meares, 2008). 
Unfortunately, depending on the unit supporting an area, a lack of support or 
coordination may minimize CAT effectiveness. As a non-lethal asset, many combat arms 
leaders give CA little credence in their ability to improve the security situation, or fail to 
understand how to support CA units and integrate them into the unit’s overall strategy. 
For example, one CA company assigned to support a brigade lacked both administrative 
and security support (Orbock, 2005). Fulfilling and managing these requirements out-of-
hide reduced the number of CA personnel available for CA missions (Orbock, 2005). 
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2. Civil Military Operations Centers (CMOCs) 
CMOCs usually operate in an area support role supporting a brigade or a division. 
CMOCs coordinate the efforts of the regional CATs, IGOs, and NGOs working within 
the area (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006b, p. 2-5). The CMOC rarely has 
direct command and control over any of the elements that it supports or coordinates (R. 
Lewis, personal communication, October 9, 2008). Instead, the CMOC may serve mainly 
in an information management role, collecting and passing information (not necessarily 
intelligence) among the organizations it supports and coordinates (F. Smith, personal 
communication, October 7, 2008).  
This role coordinating and deconflicting is extremely important. Military CA 
efforts should complement those of IGOs and NGOs working locally, and avoid overlap 
or sabotage. For example, if an NGO is working to construct a sewer system, if the U.S. 
is working on a similar effort in a neighboring area, the two systems should be 
compatible and if necessary share resources and coordinate planning and execution. 
These organizations also can share information on local preferences and needs so that CA 
can facilitate linking organizations most suited to performing a given humanitarian 
mission with the need. 
Integrating and coordinating CA efforts into a greater U.S. strategy to affect a 
specific result is a challenge. Conducting miscellaneous projects that the local 
government cannot support when the intervention is over are pointless. For example, 
building a power plant and failing to ensure sufficient local support to maintain the 
facility, or building a factory when the area lacks sufficient or consistent power. The U.S. 
effort should have a desired end-state or goal such as establishing a functioning state, or 
reinforcing existing governing structures. A lack of coordination with other projects and 
goals may lead to ultimate and overall failure of the entire intervention. 
3. Provincial Reconstruction Teams  
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are “joint teams of international civilian 
and military personnel, operating at the provincial level…that undertake activities in the 
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areas of security, reconstruction, support to central governance and limited relief 
operations” (Mc Hugh & Gostelow, 2004, p. 1). The goal of PRTs is to decentralize 
support and operations to reach rural areas and to integrate the population into the 
reconstruction process. PRTs are currently operating only in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Different countries around the world sponsor PRTs, and each one issues its own specific 
guidance and rules of engagement. For simplicity, this paper will address only U.S. 
PRTs.  
The military is rapidly improving and expanding its interagency (IA) coordination 
and PRTs are one of the best examples of this integration. Many PRTs consist of 
personnel from several different USG agencies, such as the DoD, DOS, and USAID. 
Because of this, CA officers must interact with subject matter experts and other personnel 
highly educated and experienced in economic development. For example, many of the 
State Department personnel who conduct reconstruction and stability operations have 
PhDs in economics or a related field. CA officers need to be versed and competent in 
both the language and the fields of those with whom they interact to garner credibility 
and to translate complex development philosophy into a language the local population 
can understand.  
Another challenge CA personnel on PRTs encounter is trying to work closely 
with non-military organizations in the area. For example, many NGOs express an 
unwillingness to associate with the military because it may make them potential targets to 
enemies (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2003). This fear and 
the lack of trust can hamper the military’s mission accomplishment. CA officers must be 
able to adapt and to assuage security concerns through independent actions and a 
commonsense assessment of the active threat environment. 
In addition, the local population the military is attempting to help may associate 
uniforms with the prior regime’s repression, or may find trusting personnel wearing the 
same uniform as those that targeted them or their families at an earlier time difficult (Mc 
Hugh & Gostelow, 2004). Thus CA officers must find a way to distinguish themselves 
from military combat personnel (such as uniform wear and actions) while still adhering to 
the rules of engagement. 
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D. OPERATIONAL CIVIL AFFAIRS 
The operational level focuses on “immediate and near-term issues (for example, 
dislocated civilian [DC] operations, public safety programs, and so on), synchronization 
of CMO support to tactical commanders, and integration of interagency operations with 
military operations” (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2003, p. 1-5). 
At the operational level, CA officers serve as S-9s or G-9s on Division and Corps 
level staffs. CA functional specialists are most relevant at the operational and strategic 
levels, serving in a planning and advisory role to commanders and working within CMO 
cells (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006b, p. 1-9).  
E. STRATEGIC CIVIL AFFAIRS 
This area is rarely addressed and is difficult to delineate. According to doctrine, at 
the strategic level, the goal is on “larger long-term global or regional issues such as 
economic development and stability” (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2003, p. 
1-5).  
The CA elements that conduct these types of operations are staff officers at the 
Corps level or at the geographic combatant command level, the Civil Affairs Command 
(CACOM) (USAR only). The CACOM’s mission “is to provide theater-level CA 
planning, coordination, policies, and programs in support of stabilization, reconstruction, 
and development efforts” (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006b, p. 2-2). CA 
officers at this echelon coordinate and support CA operations and efforts theater-wide 
through CAPTs, CLTs, CIM, and CMOCs (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 
2006b, p. 2-5). 
F. CONCLUSION 
Post 9/11, many military forces and branches found that the military leadership 
changed or augmented their operational roles. The CA branch is no exception. For 
example, during the most recent military deployment to Afghanistan and Iraq, the Army 
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already reorganized into modular Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs). The CA branch 
adapted and reorganized to support this new structure.  
After the official end of hostilities, senior leaders looked to CA officers as the 
military’s reconstruction experts. They expected CA officers to play a complex planning, 
coordinating, and advising role to the BCT leadership while simultaneously working with 
NGOs and local community organizations. In addition, they also expected CA officers to 
supervise and integrate the activities of the various tactical CA teams and PRTs operating 
in the BCT’s area of operations.  
While senior leaders had these expectations, most CA officers received training 
only in tactical civil affairs. Operational and strategic CA skills were not a part of the 
CAQC, and ILE only recently incorporated stability operations into its curriculum. The 
military’s PME focuses on kinetic combat operations, and IW is a paradigm shift from 
this, where words and deeds can have an impact on par with a bomb or artillery shells. 
Even with recent changes and updates, ILE and CAQC still lack a key educational 
component of stability and security operations: the logic behind the strategy; to earn the 
trust and support of the population through their “the hearts and minds.” 
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IV. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
This chapter identifies the tasks and skills CA officers need to operate 
successfully in the current and future security environment by comparing the demand for 
CA officer jobs and roles to the tasks and skills taught throughout the CA officer 
educational pipeline. After assessing whether shortfalls exists between the demand and 
the supply, Chapter V evaluates alternate means of educating CA officers throughout 
their careers. 
This chapter will proceed by first evaluating the CA officer skills requirements as 
formally indicated in doctrine. Second, the chapter will suggest and describe additional 
skill requirements evidenced during the course of research that would enhance the utility 
and effectiveness of CA officers. Third, the chapter lists and describes CA officer 
educational shortfalls. The chapter closes with a discussion of several options to better 
educate and inculcate CA officers with these critical skills. 
A. CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICER SKILL REQUIREMENTS 
DA PAM 600-3 lists the specific skills and characteristics of a CA officer. Many 
of these skills acknowledge and differentiate the unique skills CA officers require to 
operate effectively. 
The core competencies for CA officers are cross-cultural communications, 
regional expertise, language ability, interpersonal skills, personal lethality 
(Warrior Ethos), adaptive thinking and/or leadership, and technical 
proficiency. The CA officer is an expert in the command and employment 
of functional specialists, CA individuals, teams, and units in execution of 
these missions. CA officers are unique within CA forces because they 
provide special or unique civilian core competency skills...They must have 
the ability to solve complex political-military problems and develop and 
employ conventional and unconventional solutions. They also must be 
able to devise and execute non-standard and non-doctrinal methods and 
techniques when applicable to remedy unforeseen circumstances, and 
capable of decisive action for missions for which no doctrine exists. 
(Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2007, p. 180) 
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1. Cross-Cultural Communications, Regional Expertise, Language 
Ability 
As the Civil-Military experts, commanders at all levels expect that CA officers 
have a particular background and expertise in an area of operations. These leaders expect 
that the CA officers can speak the language and relate to the local population, regardless 
of the team’s experience level. This is not always the case; because of the high demand 
placed on the CA branch, many reserve or Individual Ready Reserve24 (IRR) officers 
lack CA experience or background (J.K. Owens, personal communication, October 30, 
2008; G. Woodson, personal communication, November 18, 2008).  
Feedback from current PRT operations in Afghanistan and Iraq illustrates this 
problem. One of the biggest concerns is “a deficiency of cultural awareness, regional 
knowledge, and local language skills” (Roe, 2005, p. 25). In such cases, adding an 
economist to a team will not help if that economist will not solicit input and understand 
the local environment. “Ignorance of tribal customs leads to misunderstanding and 
alienation. While insurgents communicate freely to gain intelligence, PRT members’ 
inability to speak tribal languages is a barrier to basic understanding and communication. 
Language difficulty prevents tactical units from establishing working relationships with 
village elders and receiving local intelligence” (Roe, 2005, p. 25).  
Clear cultural understanding helped the Coalition successfully address the issue of 
militia groups in Iraq. The Coalition created the Sons of Iraq program, which successfully 
co-opted individuals economically who may otherwise be committing violence against 
Coalition forces in Iraq. The Sons of Iraq are a paid militia whose job is not to produce, 
but to reduce violence (Pincus, 2008). This program is successful for several reasons. 
First, it provides an economic incentive not to attack Coalition forces and provides men 
with an income to support their families. Second, the militia group maintains an 
important role in the local society, and the men retain their weapons, both of which 
preserve their authority and power status to the rest of the public, fulfilling their 
                                                 
24 Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) officers are officers who left the military before meeting their 
eight-year contractual obligation. In the event of a national need, the USG may recall IRR personnel to 
serve on active duty until their contract time expires.  
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emotional self-interest of needing respect and position. Third, the militia addresses an 
underlying historical narrative, in which local males and tribe members were empowered 
to protect their own families. In addition, having a job and earning an income positively 
enhance self-esteem and alleviate the need for criminal behavior to feed a family or to 
earn respect.  
2. Leadership and Adaptive Thinking  
One of the most important skills of a military officer is leadership, especially in 
the area of SO: “dynamic, transformational leadership is central to any successful effort. 
It is the catalyst that drives broad success in any operation. Effective leadership inspires 
and influences others to work together toward a common goal; this is the essence of unity 
of effort” (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2008b, p. 1-18). Yet leadership 
requirements in the highly networked environments of stability operations require a 
greater boundary-spanning role for leaders (Williams, 2002).  
The military typically operates according to rank, roles, and rules to divide work 
and labor. CA officers must be able to coordinate a variety of functions among diverse 
groups of people and organizations, many of whom may not be military. Some may be 
host nation assets, NGOs, or other local organizations or players with a stake in the 
country or region’s outcome.  
Most active duty CA officers have a background in a conventional Army branch. 
These branches have a much different culture and approach to leadership than that 
required of CA officers. The conventional Army tends to operate in a strict vertical 
hierarchy of rank and function. Because this vertical decision making process is 
emphasized and rewarded, a military leader coming from this environment may lack the 
skills to operate outside the normal hierarchical environment to which he or she is 
accustomed. The flexible, cooperative nature needed to coordinate and manage 
relationships with other organizations sometimes operates unpredictably, and according 
to different rules. Networking between organizations “emphasizes fluid and flexible 
patterns of working based on communications networks….Expertise, not status, is the 
basis of personnel advancement and recognition” (Holohan, 2005, p. 140). 
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The flexibility needed for working cooperatively with other organizations 
may be difficult for military officers; because military operations require 
officers to distill order out of chaos, the military has developed an 
institutional culture that abhors disorder and uncertainty. Decision making 
is sequential, orderly, and based on fact and consistency of the outcome 
with preconceived precepts. (Holohan, 2005, p. 140) 
This does not mean that military personnel are incapable of adapting to a volatile 
environment. In Iraq, General Petraeus recognized this adjustment from traditional 
military leadership roles: “One of the tests for a commander – at all levels – is to 
recognize the environment and to adjust and adapt constantly to it” (Lundberg, 2006, p. 
37). If one approach he tried did not work, he tried another. If he encountered an obstacle, 
such as the Coalition’s closing all the borders and prohibiting trade, he worked to gain an 
exemption and to establish policies that the Coalition would accept (Lundberg, 2006). 
3. Interpersonal Skills 
One of the key aspects of CA officers is working closely and coordinating with 
other organizations, both military and civilian. Interpersonal, leadership, and networking 
skills are an integral part of this capability.  
Formality is an important cultural factor that can have a significant effect on 
interpersonal relations. Informality in relations is critical to developing trust and 
communication between different organizations working together. An organization with a 
leader who maintains an open door policy and knows everyone’s name develops a 
significant level of trust and contribution within the organization. In contrast, a leader 
who maintains a strict formality, keeps his door closed, and sees visitors by appointment 
only instead of leaving the safety of the base and meeting local people or aid workers 
produces an attitude that discourages participation and prevents the leader from 
developing personal relationships (Holohan, 2005).  
Excessive formality can hamper the military’s effectiveness. With a rank-based, 
hierarchical structure, the military depends on the rank structure to maintain discipline 
and control. Officers in the conventional Army are indoctrinated into this type of 
environment, where “the value of people’s contribution [is] limited to their formal role” 
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(Holohan, 2005, p. 77). CA officers must overcome their indoctrination from the 
conventional military and adapt their thinking to working in a complex environment. 
CATs often operate in remote regions away from other conventional units and without 
significant assets or assistance. In this environment, every member of the team is critical 
to the mission’s success. Some military leaders cannot conceptualize that a low-ranking 
private may have an idea to enhance an organization’s operational effectiveness or 
mission accomplishment, but in CA, expertise is more important than status, and 
everyone has something to contribute, an attitude that is integral to creative and 
innovative problem solving. The free flow of information is critical to generating new 
and unique ideas and solutions.  
4. Ability to Solve Complex Political-Military Problems  
CA officers must constantly confront what Holohan calls “nonroutine complex 
problems” and must be prepared to address them (Holohan, 2005, p. 64). Problem-
solving skills are important because many of the problems encountered during CA 
operations have no operational precedent, and a leader must be able to think on his or her 
feet and to make decisions with little guidance or instruction.   
 The types of problems encountered in CA operations are nonlinear in that they 
rarely have a doctrinal answer or solution. These types of problems are atypical of the 
conventional military expectation, which often focuses on “by-the-book” solutions or 
problem solving methods. Many of the challenges CA officers face fall into the category 
of “wicked problems,” a category of problems that are extremely difficult if not 
impossible to solve (Department of the Army, 2008, p. 9). Table 8 illustrates the 
differences among the types of operational problems. According to DA Pam 525-5-500, 
most conventional military training and planning addresses problems in the first two 
categories, “well-structured ‘puzzle’,” or “medium-structured ‘structurally complex 
problem’” (Department of the Army, 2008, p. 9)25. The typical military officer does not 
doctrinally train for these types of problems. 
                                                 
25 For more information on complex problems, see Appendix A, an excerpt from DA Pam 525-5-500, 
which describes the category of complex problems as adapted to operational challenges. 
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An example of such a solution is how one CAT project fulfilled the village of El 
Agar’s need for clean water. The team understood that the village could not afford 
generators to pump the water from the well and needed a self-sustaining, low-cost 
solution. This resulted in the solution of digging a well and taking advantage of the 
village’s location in a natural wind-tunnel by integrating a windmill to pump the water 
(Meares, 2008, p. 12).   
Military education already teaches problem-solving and decision-making skills, 
but could improve its capabilities in this area by integrating more original, scenario-based 
training into PME or a CA specific curriculum26.  
 
Table 8.    Types of Problems and Solution Strategies (From Department of the 
Army, 2008, p. 9) 
5.  Collaborative Problem Solving 
Collaborative problem solving is a problem-solving process integral to working 
with diverse groups of people. CA officers must approach problems through the cultural 
context to facilitate negotiation and problem-solving. “Negotiation is a basic means of 
getting what you want from others. It is back-and-forth communication designed to reach 
agreement when you and the other side have some interests that are shared and others that 
are opposed” (Windle & Warren, 2008).  
                                                 
26 The NPS DA program offers a course in “Wicked Problems.” (Naval Postgraduate School general 
catalog, 2008) 
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There are several key principles of collaborative problem solving to consider. 
Identifying and then integrating the relevant stakeholders is important. Stakeholders are 
the people who have the power to make or block a decision, formally and informally, 
those who are impacted by a decision, and those who have expertise to facilitate the 
decision ("Book review: how to make collaboration work," 2007). A stakeholder analysis 
is key to organizing and directing efforts (Roberts & King, 1989, p. 70). Depending on 
the area or environment, many different groups could be actively competing for 
dominance. While the sheer number of stakeholders may seem overwhelming, they 
naturally fall into categories (Roberts & King, 1989, p. 68). For example, some groups 
will only be interested in black-market oil, others will want roads, others schools. These 
interest-categories will help assess which policies will affect and influence which 
stakeholders. 
The goal of identifying stakeholders and their interests is to develop consensus. In 
the consensus phase, all the players in the decision making process must agree to the 
support the final decision. It is easier to break decisions into small parts instead of an “all 
or nothing” proposition, which can alienate key supporters ("Book review: how to make 
collaboration work," 2007). 
The best way to effectively integrate the local population and generate buy-in is 
through direct local involvement. One technique is to establish committees at the local 
level, whether a city or township composed of the local stakeholders, government 
employees, and leaders. They are the ones that need to establish the exact priorities for 
projects and construction efforts. The local committee is also the one that will be 
responsible for managing the projects. The goal is to decentralize decisions to the local 
level and avoid the Coalition’s dictating all decisions throughout the province.  
B. ADDITIONAL SKILL SETS 
While DA PAM 600-3 lists the “official” skill list for CA officers, an effective 
CA officer must possess many other skills and knowledge sets. For example, one of the 
keys to effective state building is the development of social networks with the local 
population. The ability to develop and exert influence through these ties and relationships 
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can mean the difference between success and failure. CA officers must also have a solid 
grasp of project management, economic development, and IW techniques to provide the 
most effective, integrated support to whatever type of force they are supporting.  
1.  Developing a Network  
CA officers must be able to use their leadership and interpersonal skills to 
develop a network from scratch. The simplest means is to tie into existing networks. 
Existing networks of both individuals and organizations will simplify and facilitate the 
creation of a network organization. The officer must first be able to find and to identify 
the network. Many of these networks are covert and small. Once CA officers gain access 
to the network, often word of positive deeds will spread rapidly throughout the network, 
and support will increase27 (McAdam, 2003).  
Some of these networks will be leery of contact with foreigners and CA officers 
will need a delicate touch. CA officers can integrate extremist groups by working with 
leaders to focus on issues and actions instead of individual personalities. For example, 
while the extremist groups may not advocate a girls’ school, they are more likely to 
support repairing a factory or power plant. 
Part of the process of developing a network is identifying the leaders, or those 
individuals, who because of their formal leadership position, religious role, or other place 
in society, demonstrate influence over others’ opinions and behavior. These personnel 
sometimes appear to have a disproportionate influence over others (Gladwell, 2000). 
“The relationship the team builds with the local tribal leaders can extend beyond the 
village as many of these leaders have influence even beyond the national boundaries,” 
notes the leader of a CA team in Kut, Iraq (Meares, 2008). 
CA officers and teams cannot and should not be responsible for every SO task 
that comes up. CA officers should support good governance, reconstruction, and 
economic development, but they should not rely on their knowledge alone. CA officers 
                                                 
27 This idea is based on social network theory, which explores the connections between individuals 
and the spread of ideas. People tend to be influenced more by those whose opinion they value compared to 
people with whom they do not routinely associate or interact (McAdam, 2003). 
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should be able to identify locals, IGO or NGO personnel, or a USG agent who is the 
subject matter expert in a given area and integrate their expertise and knowledge.  
Networks need not be limited to the local environment, either. External 
organizations can provide useful ideas and serve as sounding boards with Wikis and 
websites for suggestions. These networks, military and otherwise, utilize diverse 
expertise and support from around the world and bring it to the local level even in remote 
regions through the internet.  
Developing social embeddedness, “the personal ties that assure loyalty and trust, 
which in turn facilitate effective communication of information and the assumption of 
collaborative problem-solving responsibility” are another means to encourage network 
development (Holohan, 2005, p.81). A leader has many options to encourage dialogue. 
These include both planned and unplanned events such as celebratory events, dinners, or 
informal social gatherings, meals, and parties. These types of events provide opportunity 
for informal communication and encourage people to get to know one another and to 
develop friendships transcending organizations and cultures. For example, one military 
peacekeeper working in Croatia noted that “with each step forward, we would organize a 
party and an official ceremony to show our appreciation for the commitment and 
goodwill of the people involved and to urge them to keep on cooperating” (Schoups, 
2001, p. 393). 
2.   Developing Trust in a Complex Environment 
Trust is integral in uncertain environments: “Trusting becomes the crucial strategy 
for dealing with an uncertain and uncontrollable future” (Sztompka, 1999, p. 25). Trust is 
about one person’s expectations for another’s behaviors: “Trust is a bet about the future 
contingent actions of others” (Sztompka, 1999, p. 25). Predictability in actions simplifies 
complex environments by eliminating or reducing the unknown variables. Developing 
trust is integral in the current and future threat environment for multiple reasons. Trust 
facilitates cooperation, support, and the development of social capital, which is vital to 
working with different stakeholders with various interests.  
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Colonel Baker, a former brigade commander in Baghdad, Iraq, experienced the 
challenges and benefits of earning the trust and confidence of the Iraqis. He realized that 
positive and accurate information was not getting to the local Iraqis because of the 
slanted coverage of both the Arab media and international news stations. He focused on 
disseminating accurate information and communicating with the local press and Iraqi 
citizens to enhance Coalition credibility.  
Col. Baker realized that most Iraqis would not be in contact with any media 
source or the Coalition, so local leaders and imams could influence Iraqi citizens and help 
generate Coalition support. He integrated local leaders into the decision-making process 
through weekly roundtables to address the concerns of leaders. This forum for discussion 
and the fact that local citizens could influence Coalition actions added to the Iraqis’ trust 
and confidence (Baker, 2006). This integration also made the Coalition accountable to the 
population, which was “important for the creation and maintenance of trust, exchange of 
information, and collaborative problem solving” (Holohan, 2005, p. 85). Integrating the 
local population into the decision-making process at every step produces transparency 
and accountability in operations, which leads to trust in the organization, its motives, and 
its operations. Col. Baker’s efforts increased the number of positive stories published 
about the coalition and increased cooperation between his force and the local Iraqis 
through tips, information, and joint projects (Baker, 2006, pp. 30-31). 
In another example, a CA team leader operating in Kut, Iraq, noted that a CA 
team’s interactions with the local population have significant effects outside of that area. 
“As the team gains the village’s trust and respect, they become more effective in 
accomplishing their missions and helping the Government of Iraq accomplish its goals” 
(Meares, 2008). 
CA officers have an integral role in this type of operational environment. CA 
officers must develop and foster trust with the people with whom they work, including 
the local population, IGOs, and NGOs. Many of the same expectations of honesty, 
integrity, and consistency apply to all stakeholders. In addition, CA actions and projects 
themselves are key to exerting U.S. goals in an SO environment. 
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3.   Influence 
Working within networks and interacting with different agencies, both foreign 
and domestic, requires the ability to exert influence28, or convince people to do what the 
U.S. wants them to do. This includes persuading local sheiks to support Coalition efforts, 
or a local religious leader to ameliorate hate speeches against the U.S. CA officers must 
understand how, when, and where to exert influence to affect the desired goal.  
One method of generating influence within a network is being as central is 
possible and facilitating communication and networking between individuals and 
organizations. Centrality in a network leads to power29. Those with links to more people 
and involved in more networks can control information flow and content. The more 
networks to which one is connected, especially as the person bridging multiple networks, 
the increased likelihood of receiving information faster than others further removed or 
with fewer links in the network. Knowledge and information are power, and CA officers 
can use their connection to local and foreign agencies to influence the other organizations 
and people within the network (Pfeffer, 1994). 
Military scholars frequently cite Cialdini influence techniques when referencing 
SOF operations. These techniques describe several methods that SOF can use to develop 
influential relationships during their operations (Coughran, 2007). Table 9 lists some 
techniquese based on “deep-seated characteristics of human nature that lend themselves 






                                                 
28 “The term influence refers to a type of response whereby one person or a group of people will 
acquiesce to the requests of another” (Coughran, 2007, p. 15). 
29 Network centrality can have different meanings. In one sense, centrality means how many 




Obedience to authority Authority often leads to automatic compliance 
Commitment, consistency Behave in accordance with our previous decisions 
Likeability Similarity, common ground 
Scarcity You always want what you can't have 
Planning Know who you are trying to influence 
Table 9.   Cialdini’s Influence Techniques (After Coughran, 2007, pp. 15-18) 
These techniques serve as a guide to techniques by which military personnel can 
indirectly influence and convince local leaders and the population to support or help 
them. This can be as simple as earning the trust of the local sheik, or convincing a local 
militia to work for the military instead of support the insurgents.    
4. Counterinsurgency and Guerilla Warfare 
While CA operates in many different types of environments, CA’s mission is 
always oriented on the civilian population. As discussed in Chapter II, the present and 
future wars must focus on the local population and earning their support. This philosophy 
is not well-integrated into either the military’s PME system or the CA officer educational 
pipeline. However, the “hearts and minds” philosophy is integral to developing 
operational plans and concepts. As one CA officer noted 
Current doctrine is antiquated for low intensity, counter insurgency 
operations. Most Civil Affairs units focus on quick, easy, and feel good 
strategies instead of long term, exit strategies designed to leverage the 
maneuver commander’s intent. Civil Military doctrine training at 
TRADOC schools must be revitalized to include books like The Small 
Wars Manual and similar low intensity, win the hearts and minds types of 
materials. Additionally, developing soldiers to understand the complexity 
and interrelationships of governmental, economic, military, and 
informational functions is a must. (Orbock, 2005, p. 15). 
The issue pertains to both conventional branches and to CA. Combat leaders need 
to be educated in these concepts to integrate CA into all plans and operations. CA officers 
need to understand how to plan and direct actions to achieve a specific impact. The goal 
in an integrated approach is to earn the respect of the civilian population. Merely 
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conducting projects and hoping that they help the overall war effort is inefficient, 
ineffective, and may ultimately cause more harm than good.  
One of the best frameworks to illustrate this concept is termed the “Mystic 
Diamond,” shown in Appendix F. This very simple model illustrates the interrelationship 
of the various elements present in environments such as Iraq and Afghanistan and serves 
as a firm basis by which to assess implications of U.S. actions. Understanding this 
framework would be useful for all CA operating levels, tactical, operational, and 
strategic. 
5. Economics of Insurgencies 
McCormick’s Mystic Diamond model ties into behavioral economics. Behavioral 
economics, or a historical narrative, helps to explain people’s actions. CA personnel need 
to understand how people perceive the world and how it ties into their actions. Most 
people believe that others make logical or rational decisions; that people think logically, 
analyze their problems, and make decisions based on a cost-benefit model. This implies 
that the person has a clear understanding and relatively complete knowledge of the 
problem. To make a decision, a person uses the cost-benefit model to assess whether an 
action will benefit more than hurt a person. This cost-benefit analysis model assesses 
economic gain and reputational benefits as the possible positive outcomes against the 
potential negative outcomes of arrest, wounding, or death.  
For example, in terms of conflict, a member of the population may determine that 
the potential cost of planting an improvised explosive device (IED) (potential arrest, 
possible death) may outweigh positive benefits (monetary gain to feed his family, 
enhanced reputation), or vice versa. If the benefits outweigh the costs to the individual, 
he will plant the IED, otherwise he will not.  
Some of the costs and benefits are culture specific (reputational, for example) and 
an individual in one situation may weigh the costs and benefits differently than another in 
the same circumstances because of his or her historical narrative. For an American 
soldier, staying alive and returning to his family may a priority, while a foreign military 
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fighter from Syria may place dying for the Muslim cause first. The American and Syrian 
may view the choices of the other as irrational based on their respective narratives. 
Economics also ties into the causes and ways to prevent conflict. Economics is 
more than supply and demand. 
 
Figure 10.   A Simple Economic Model (McNab, 2008) 
The model in Figure 10 is based upon the basic principles of supply and demand. 
The model begins with scarcity of a given commodity or service. Scarcity means demand 
exceeds availability. Demand leads to higher prices, which differentiates who can possess 
the item and who cannot. Because the item is scarce and more people want it than can 
afford it, the demand can produce social effects or change based on social effects. A 
social effect might be infant or elderly mortality or immigration rates to a region. For 
example, if clean drinking water as a resource is scarce, this may affect infant mortality, 
and increased population migration to a city may increase scarcity by increasing demand. 
Scarcity and social factors can combine and produce other social effects. For 
example, in the clean water example, an individual may decide that his child needs clean 
water more than another family without small children, and approach the head of the 
household and try to purchase or steal his water. If this fails, he may try to intimidate or 
scare the other head of household into giving him his water. The individual may 
ultimately decide that violence is his last option, that the risks outweigh the benefits, and 
assault the head of the other household and take his water. In this way, scarcity and social 
factors can interact and ultimately escalate to violence.  
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The last factor in the model is consequences. The previous three issues, scarcity, 
social effects, and conflict, result in consequences. Consequences of the water scarcity 
example could be death, and violence as an accepted means to effect water transactions, 
and desensitization to violence throughout the society. A society and individuals’ 
historical narrative and framework will interact with the environment to shape the 
interaction of scarcity, social effects, and conflict. 
Understanding these models is important for a CA officer operating in a conflict 
or pre-conflict environment because it provides a framework to understand the decisions 
that people make. The CA officer can use the framework to assess projects and actions 
and determine whether a project will garner popular support. 
6. Financial Management and Project Management 
“CA units should come with the skills and information management equipment to 
facilitate better-managed effects with money,” from an AAR, 425th Civil Affairs 
Battalion with 1 AD 21 December 2004 (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006b, 
p. 3-13). A common AAR comment from CA officers is a lack of experience or 
understanding of the different pools of money associated with IW and SO. Understanding 
which funding sources they can use for which types of projects and how to apply for the 
funds would eliminate a significant source of confusion. 
Project management is another area in which CA officers receive little training. 
While some projects may be small in scope or scale, others are complex, long-term, and 
involve many different vendors, companies, and smaller projects. Project management 
would help CA officers simultaneously facilitate, manage, and balance many long-term 
projects efficiently and effectively.   
C. SHORTFALLS 
This thesis assesses the shortfalls in the education supply by comparing the 
demand derived in Chapter II to the educational supply in Chapter III. Table 10 lists the 
results of a comparison between CA skill requirements and those that CA officers learn 
throughout their careers.  
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In the current and future threat environment, the skills in Table 3 are integral to 
success. As the CA mission requirements increase around the world, leaders will expect 
CA officers to be able to take the helm, plan, and conduct integrated SO or reconstruction 
missions that will contribute to the U.S.’ long-term goals. However, CA officers must 








Table 10.   CA Skill and Task Educational Shortfalls 
Just as in any career field, CA officers do not necessarily utilize all critical skills 
at all times. Tactical CA requires a different skill set from operational and strategic. 
Promotion to field grade leads to a CA officer performing more operational and strategic 
level jobs as opposed to tactical. Ideally, CA officers would receive a second knowledge 
infusion at the field grade level, after having time to absorb and experience the tactical 
CA mission first hand.  
Typically, students do not fully internalize knowledge and skills are until they 
practically use them in real world applications. Attempting to teach students to perform 
tasks in situations in which they have little or no experience is not usually effective. 
While practical exercises can alleviate part of this problem, the real world may be 
completely different. 
Shortfalls 
Assess and implement plans to support environmental security 
Assess and implement plans to support global health concerns and 
issues 
Operate in complex environments 
Conduct and coordinate stability operations 
Plan for long-term economic development  
Conduct and coordinate prevention operations 
Form hasty networks 
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D. EDUCATIONAL OPTIONS 
1.  Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) 
While NPS already has a SOCCOM-sponsored Master’s program in place, this 
program is not always readily accessible or convenient to Reserve CA officers. Between 
deployments, training time, and full-time jobs, Reserve CA officers often lack the time to 
divert or dedicate to full time schooling and education.  
 
Figure 11.   International Public Policy Graduate Program in Stability, Security, and 
Development (From Guttieri, 2008a, p. 11) 
NPS, working with the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, 
developed a pilot certificate program to assist Reserve CA officers in earning a Master’s 
degree and garnering the critical skills and knowledge to fulfill their responsibilities, 
primarily at the field grade level. Figure 11 shows the courses and outline of the Master’s 
degree program in Stability, Security, and Development. NPS designed the program so 




four weeks in-residence. This will minimize impact on the officers of missing work for a 
prolonged period outside deployments while still facilitating a rewarding educational 
experience. 
 
Figure 12.   Military Occupational Specialty 38A United States Army Reserve Civil 
Affairs Officer Qualification Course (Woodson, 2008a, pp. 8-9) 
USACAPOC and NPS also developed a course to qualify new CA majors (38A). 
The course will involve DE followed by a four-week, portable resident program 
(Woodson, 2008a). Figure 12 illustrates the draft course curriculum. Such a course would 
alleviate the current knowledge shortfalls that new field grade officers experience on the 
transition from tactical to operational and strategic CA operations.  
2.  Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) 
The JSOU offers many programs that support CA and stability operations. One of 
their most popular programs is the Joint Civil-Military Operations Campaign Planning 
Workshop. The course “is specifically intended to prepare CA personnel to be more 
proficient in the Joint planning process” (G.E. Doan, personal communication, October 9, 
2008). Appendix E lists the course syllabus, which includes key tasks such as interagency 
planning, CA assessment, COA development, and fiscal management, among other 
relevant modules.  
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Students consistently award the course positive feedback on its relevance and 
utility (Joint Civil-Military Operations, 2008; D. E. Doan, personal communication, 
October 9, 2008). Many CA officers who attended the course noted that they benefited 
greatly from the experience, which covered many areas not covered extensively in the 
CAQC ("Student comments - JCMOCPW 08C," 2008; R. Lewis, personal 
communication, October 9, 2008).  
The JSOU course would be a tremendous asset to field grade CA officers 
expected to enter operational and strategic CA level jobs. Experienced personnel teach 
the course, which includes hands-on practical exercises to reinforce the material. The 
JSOU course also has the advantage of being both short and portable. JSOU instructors 
teach the five day course three times a year at CA units around the world (G.E. Doan, 
personal communication, November 24, 2008). 
3. Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management  
(DISAM) 
DISAM “provides professional education, research, and support to advance U.S. 
foreign policy through security assistance and cooperation” ("About DISAM," 2008). A 
DoD-run institution, DISAM provides multiple courses and programs useful for CA 
officers. Their curricula include on-site and distance education courses for those 
conducting stability operations, including inter-agency cooperation, leadership skills, 
cultural awareness, and public diplomacy (Toomey, 2008, pp. 1 & 4). 
DISAM also manages a 12-month graduate-level studies program called GMAP II 
in conjunction with Tufts University in Massachusetts, the result of which is an 
international affairs focused Global Master of Arts from the Fletcher School of Law and 
Diplomacy (Toomey, 2008, p. 4). 
4. Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy 
Tufts offers the GMAP program, a one-year international studies program 
designed for mid to senior professionals working in business, politics, or other 
international oriented fields ("GMAP Homepage," 2008). Courses include leadership, 
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foreign policy, international trade and investment, and international politics among other 
pertinent topics ("GMAP Courses," 2008). The program combines distance education 
with period resident sessions. 
5. Norwich University’s Master of Arts in Diplomacy 
Norwich University’s Master of Arts in Diplomacy is another program designed 
for established professionals seeking to expand their knowledge of the international 
arena. The program can take 18 to 24 months depending on the option of a thesis track 
and offers three different concentrations ("Masters of Arts in Diplomacy," 2008). Two of 
these concentrations, international terrorism and international conflict management, are 
particularly relevant to CA officers. The international terrorism concentration focuses on 
both state sponsored and non-state sponsored terrorism, while the international conflict 
management concentration focuses on avoidance, management, and mitigation of conflict 
for those who practice diplomacy and post-conflict nation building ("Masters of Arts in 
Diplomacy," 2008). 
6.  University of Montana  
The University of Montana is currently developing an interdisciplinary program. 
The five-year, distance education program “would combine courses focusing on 
leadership and analysis, international relations, micro-development economics, social and 
cultural anthropology, national security, cross-cultural communications, the interagency 
process, terrorism, negotiations, and regional courses” oriented towards a professional 
audience including military officers, diplomatic, and NGO personnel (Howard, 2008, pp. 
42-43). 
7.  James Madison University 
James Madison University’s school of School of Public and International Affairs 
is developing a program that supports CA functions. “The proposed curriculum for the 
graduate course includes research methods, ethics and leadership, public management 
issues, international relations, public information and communication, communication in 
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conflict situations (including mediation and conflict resolution and cross-cultural 
communication), and strategic planning” (Howard, 2008). The program will conclude 
with a “Capstone event” to integrate students’ knowledge “to develop a country report, 
campaign plan, and business plan” (Howard, 2008). 
E. CONCLUSION 
The current and future threat requires the military to perform new and different 
roles. The augmented responsibilities reflected in branches such as CA dictate that the 
branch and the personnel within it must evolve to remain relevant. Some of the key skills 
that CA officers need and are not learning in sufficient detail are the ability to create 
networks, cultivate trust within those networks, and exert positive influence to support 
U.S. goals. Educating CA officers in the skills and knowledge appropriate for the new 
environment is a critical part of that evolution that can only enhance CA's capabilities 
and the U.S.’ goal and mission accomplishment throughout the world.  
A variety of programs and options exist that educate students in international 
politics and policy, terrorism, negotiation, and communication. The most important 
characteristic of any program is the analytical rigor involved. The military must develop 
CA officers through critical thinking and program solving skills. Much of the historical 
background and information are relevant and useful; no step-by-step guide exists to 
instruct a CA officer on how to perform his or her job. This is especially true once an 
officer starts working at the operational and strategic levels. Guidelines, policy, and 
doctrine exist, but a CA officer must be able to work cooperatively with multiple 
elements to produce unique solutions to complex problems.  
An officer cannot merely attend one program or institution that produces such 
officers. Rather, officer education is a developmental process that continues as an officer 
rises in rank and responsibility. The military’s PME must develop such leaders who can 
evolve into adaptable CA officers. The CA officer education pipeline also must inculcate 
these skills while providing CA officers the knowledge they need to integrate themselves 






















In recent years, the military’s CA capabilities received a significant amount of 
attention. A House report published in May 2008 noted that DoDD 3000.05 indicates a 
greater need for CA-type capability and directed a study into CA force size and structure, 
proponency, and education (House Committee On Armed Services, 2008, pp. 421-422). 
The assessment of the CA educational pipeline indicates that the CAQC 
successfully introduces new CA officers to the career field and teaches them the 
rudimentary skills that they need to perform at the tactical level. The course, however, 
lacks an effective tie-in to higher level staff operations at the operational and strategic 
level. The course would also benefit from an introduction to influence operations in 
which CA officers design civil actions and projects to gain the population’s support.  
The clear result is that most company grade officers operate at the tactical level, 
while field grade officers operate at the tactical and strategic levels. Field grade officers 
need to have additional education incorporated into their professional development 
pipeline. Ideally, this would be coordinated with ILE to minimize an officer’s time away 
from the formal military. 
Another key factor is ensuring that the general purpose forces and SOF 
understand how to use and integrate CA forces into their plans and operations. While CA 
officers must be proficient within their career fields, if the leaders they support lack an 
understanding of how CA can support their plans, they are unlikely to utilize CA forces 
effectively. A staff that understands how and when to utilize CA in its planning and 
operations will be more likely to incorporate them. 
A. CHALLENGES 
The military can try to improve CA officer knowledge and capability through 
institutional knowledge and understanding. For example, the military could revise the 
CAQC education and curriculum, but creating an effective curriculum and integrating it 
into the leadership development pipeline will necessarily take time. In addition, when 
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new skills are introduced into an organization, other skills must atrophy or decrease in 
importance; training time, schooling, and operational requirements impose limits to 
developing and sustaining proficiency.   
Another consideration is the link between knowledge, experience, and learning. 
To indoctrinate a CA officer with knowledge effectively, the officer must practically 
utilize it. That is one of the key reasons that educators follow classroom education with 
practical exercises. Practical or training exercises reinforce knowledge and place it into 
perspective. Understanding that only so much knowledge can be productively transferred 
at one time is integral to developing effective training curricula.  
B. AREAS FOR FUTURE STUDY 
1.  The Right People for the Right Job? 
The CA branch will never be able to inculcate the correct skills to its officer corps 
if it does not have the right people in the branch. With the recent legislated increase in 
CA forces, the branch accessions personnel accepted more candidates than ever before. 
As with any recruiting increase, quickly increasing the number of personnel accepted 
raises the question of whether all of those accepted are sufficiently qualified, or if the 
accessions personnel lowered standards to be able to accept additional personnel. 
Active Duty officers assessed into CA must meet minimum language aptitude 
requirements and provide a resume as well as other data. A board of senior special 
operations officers30 screens candidates annually (M. R. Foreman, personal 
communication, November 6, 2008). Reserve officers place a branch transfer request 
through the reserve accessions section and their current branch (K. Brown, personal 
communication, October 9, 2008). While civilian education and language aptitude and 
capability are highly valued, as long as an officer’s current branch releases him or her and 
he or she meets the basic criteria for CA, CA accepts his or her branch transfer request 
(K. Brown, personal communication, October 9, 2008). 
                                                 
30 Senior officers include those in the ranks of O5 and above from the Special Forces, Civil Affairs, 
and Psychological Operations branches. 
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The assessment and board process for both Active duty and Reserve personnel 
should be consistent and adhere to the skills needed for a CA officer. The skills for 
Functional Specialists may differ from those of Generalists. Regardless, consistent 
standards are integral to maintaining the credibility and consistency of the branch.  
An important factor in developing the leadership skills required to perform 
effectively as a CA officer is the type of person recruited and who remain in the career 
field. Some people lack the interpersonal or social skills to facilitate relationship building. 
If not, can the military teach them these skills? The military is a hierarchal organization, 
and the personnel who rise to the most powerful and influential positions within it are 
likely to be those who excel at managing and leading hierarchies. Some people’s 
personalities and experiences may be more predisposed to excel in certain types of 
environments. 
2.  The Right Agency for the Right Job? 
a.  State Department versus CA? 
Another important question is if CA’s Functional Specialists are the right 
officers to be performing the SO jobs that the USG is currently expecting them to do. The 
DOS is more doctrinally suited to those types of tasks, especially with the experience and 
specialization of its USAID personnel. USAID personnel are responsible for the U.S.’ 
foreign assistance program ("This is USAID," 2008). USAID personnel manage funds 
and programs to support economic development and democracy around the world ("This 
is USAID," 2008). Many of their responsibilities overlap with those of CA officers. 
b.  Functional Specialists versus the Civilian Response Corps? 
A key issue is CA’s functional specialists. CA functional specialists are 
only in the USAR. When the military first created CA forces after WWII, the majority of 
CA forces were in the Reserves because of their functional specialties. The branch 
assigned the CA officers their specialties based on their civilian job skills and specialties. 
The more time passes since WWII, the less the Reserve CA meets this standard. Reserve 
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officers often become CA officers because of location in the U.S. instead of a useful 
civilian job skill (J.K. Owens, personal communication, September 30, 2008; F. Smith, 
personal communication, October 6, 2008; G. Woodson, personal communication, 
November 18, 2008). SWC or the CA proponent lack any programs designed to inculcate 
CA officers with the skills and knowledge required of functional specialists (except 
medical and legal).  
The DOS’ new Civilian Response Corps could easily replace CA 
functional specialists. They have a similar role as CA functional specialists, serving as 
subject matter experts in such areas as economics, governance, public affairs, and 
education. Just as CA functional specialists deploy to an area after the CA generalists 
conduct their assessments and other forces establish a minimal level of security, the CRC 
deploys to a relatively secure area to perform stability operations. 
Eliminating functional specialists would also eliminate a management 
problem for those responsible for managing CA officers. As mentioned previously, the 
military lacks specialized training programs to develop, sustain, or enhance many of the 
functional specialist skills. 
C.  CSIS INVESTIGATION QUESTIONS 
Studying the Civil Affairs officer educational pipeline facilitates also answers 
many of the questions posed to the CSIS study. 
1.  What are DoD Civil Affairs forces required to do in accordance with 
USG and DoD policies from the tactical to strategic levels of war? 
At the tactical level, CA officers primarily perform on Tactical Civil Affairs 
Teams conducting and managing local projects. This is true of both Generalists and 
Functional Specialists. At this level, CA officers are part of the military’s front line of 
influence operations. The projects selected and how they are planned and implemented 
can have a critical impact on the face of the conflict. Integrating local opinion and 
utilizing local labor will enhance the population’s support and credibility of the 
intervention.  
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At the operational levels, CA officers operate on staffs and coordinate civil-
military operations on a regional basis. These officers must understand how to integrate 
CA into a commander’s plans and operations, and provide guidance to subordinate and 
supported CA units to further support the commander’s political and military goals. 
2.  What are the gaps between USG/DoD policies for stability and 
reconstruction operations, and DoD Civil Affairs policy, doctrine and structure? 
As stated in USG policy, the DOS has the lead in reconstruction and stabilization 
operations. If this is the case, then the DOS must have supporting funding and a means to 
influence and integrate their operations with that of the DoD. The Consortium for 
Complex Operations is merely one example that demonstrates the difficulty of assigning 
tasks without providing the requisite support or authorities. The USG must clearly define 
and separate the responsibilities of the DOS and the DoD and align form, function, and 
funding to follow. 
The DoD lacks a central proponent that can effectively establish control of all of 
the services’ CA forces and enforce the USG’s expectations of its CA forces. An 
especially important issue is that of Reserve CA versus Active duty. The two services 
with most of the CA forces, the Army and the Marine Corps, both hold the majority of 
their CA forces in the Reserves. If the USG expects the CA mission to change from 
periodic activations to an ongoing, continuous mission, then the USG needs to shift the 
bulk of its forces to the Active duty side. This would maintain an active pool of trained 
and experienced CA officers who can perform any required CA mission at a moment’s 
notice. 
Another proponency factor that can easily be resolved is a common schoolhouse. 
While each military branch has some unique requirements and functions of its CA 
officers, all CA officers would benefit from a common core. As discussed earlier, in the 
conflict in Iraq, the Marine CAGs served much the same supporting function to Army 
units as the CATs. A common schoolhouse would provide economy of effort and scale to 
educate CA officers. Each service could incorporate service unique requirements into the 
common schoolhouse or teach them at a later time in a service-specific institution. This 
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would also alleviate the need for external agencies such as the State Department or NGOs 
to interface with multiple schools to affect the CA corps. 
3. What structure adjustments are required to ensure sufficient and 
efficient utilization of DoD Civil Affairs capabilities to support both MCO and IW 
missions? 
This question ties into the previous two questions. Without a clear understanding 
of the role and expectations that the USG expects of CA, DoD cannot effectively 
recommend or plan structural adjustment or changes. One discussion must take place 
before the other.  
Another important factor to this is the distribution of Functional Specialists versus 
Generalists. Functional Specialists’ expertise is required at the nation-building level, but 
to reach that stage, the military must first establish security. If the military can establish 
an effective level of security, then other government agencies such as the State 
Department and its Civilian Response Corps could also enter the area.  
 Another issue is recruiting Functional Specialists. Should the military recruit all 
Functional Specialists from the civilian sector, or should it grow and develop its own 
cadre? There are positive and negative aspects to each option. For example, the military 
placed the Functional Specialists into the Reserves so that the personnel could continue to 
perform their jobs between deployments. Continuous military operations and 
requirements would alleviate the problem of employment between military operations. If 
the military were to develop its own core of Functional Specialists, then the military 
would need to incorporate additional training and schooling to produce the expertise and 
overcome an initial lack of experience. Would these officers perform better if they 
performed first as Generalist and then progressed to Functional Specialists as field grade 
officers? In the short term, such a strategy would produce an intermediate shortfall of 
trained personnel as the military trained and recruited a set of Functional Specialists and 
went through the growing pains of initial training, education, doctrine, and policy. Such a 
new career path may necessarily differ from those field grade officers who remain 
generalists, which may impact future promotions and leadership positions. 
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Many military leaders expect CA Generalists to have a significant level of general 
expertise in many of the areas in which Functional Specialists focus. The Generalists 
perform a variety of mission sets across the spectrum of operations in both permissive 
and nonpermissive environment. Generalists need to be able to find and select local 
expertise which can self develop an area or generate the knowledge set - one of the most 
important lessons is that local problems are most effectively solved with local solutions. 
4. What changes should be made to DoD Directive 2000.13 “Civil 
Affairs” to ensure DoD Civil Affairs capabilities can support a whole-of-government 
approach for stabilization and reconstruction operations? 
DoDD 2000.13 needs to specify a primary proponent for DoD’s CA forces. 
DoDD 2000.13 references Army CA forces solely under USASOC. To expand DoD CA 
capabilities, CA forces should be removed from the header of Special Forces and placed 
as a separate branch with the Army’s other military branches. There are some economies 
of scale and effort such as cultural awareness and language that suggest aligning CA 
forces with SOF would be easier for the DoD, but CA forces, especially the Reserves, 
primarily provide support to conventional forces. In addition, the functional and mission 
distinction between Active and Reserve CA forces is unnecessary; both should have the 
same skill set. An outsider interacting with either a Reserve or an Active CA officer 
should find the distinction transparent.   
5. What is the appropriate mix of Special Operations Forces (SOF) and 
General Purpose Forces (GPF) Civil Affairs capabilities to support the range of 
military operations?  
 The most important factor in answering this question is the mission that the USG 
expects CA officers to perform. The CA mission requirements to support conventional 
(GPF) and SOF missions differ slightly in their intent and execution. While the military is 
shifting its focus considerably towards missions previously solely the realm of SOF, 
many SOF-specific missions such as embassy support or support to Joint Task Forces are 
still SOF specific. These questions of mission, structure, and support are interrelated. 
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D. CONCLUSION 
The military can try to improve CA officer knowledge and capability through 
institutional knowledge and understanding. For example, the military could revise the 
CAQC education and curriculum, but creating an effective curriculum and integrating it 
into the leadership development pipeline will take time. In addition, when new skills are 
introduced into an organization, other skills must atrophy or decrease in importance; 
training time, schooling, and operational requirements impose limits to developing and 
sustaining proficiency.   
The military struggles to maintain its relevancy and to sustain its proficiency 
regardless of the branch. The CA branch is no different. The current and future threat 
environment calls for more of the CA roles and responsibilities to prevent conflict and 
instability around the world. These types of operations, while not unique in the U.S.’ 
history, adapt according to the world’s context. Those operating in this environment must 




APPENDIX A: ELEVEN CHARACTERISTICS OF ILL-
STRUCTURED PROBLEMS (FROM DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, 
2008, PP. 10-11) 
(1) There is no definitive way to formulate an ill-structured problem. Given a 
tame problem, it is possible to formulate the problem with all the information necessary 
to solve it—provided that the problem-solver knows his method. However, this is not 
possible with wicked problems. The information needed to understand the problem 
depends upon how one defines it. And the solution depends upon how one understands 
the problem, or how one answers the question: “What is causing this problem?” Ill-
structured problems rarely have a single cause, and different stakeholders will see the 
relationships between the causes and their importance differently. Thus, understanding 
and formulation depend to some degree upon the perspective of the problem-solver rather 
than objective truth. This is not to say that the objective conditions do not exist, but our 
perception of these conditions as a problem that must be solved is itself subjective. Thus 
an ill-structured problem cannot be known, but must instead be constructed. As John 
Schmitt notes, “Understanding a wicked problem is not a matter of capturing reality 
sufficiently correctly, but of constructing an interpretation that is sufficiently useful in 
dealing with the reality.”  
(2) We cannot understand an ill-structured problem without proposing a solution. 
Understanding the problem and conceiving a solution are identical and simultaneous 
cognitive processes. For example, if we formulate an insurgency as the result of a failed 
regional economy, our solution will be different than if we formulated the insurgency as 
the result of poor governance. The formulation of the problem points in the direction of a 
particular solution. This insight will be discussed at greater length in the section below on 
operational art (see paragraph 1-4).  
(3) Every ill-structured problem is essentially unique and novel. Historical 
analogies may provide useful insights—particularly on individual aspects of a larger 
problem—but the differences between even similar situations are profound and 
 86
significant. The political goals at stake, stakeholders involved, cultural milieu, histories, 
and other dynamics will all be novel and unique to a particular situation.  
(4) Ill-structured problems have no fixed set of potential solutions. Since each 
wicked problem is a one-of-a-kind situation, it requires a custom solution rather than a 
standard solution modified to fit circumstances. Tactical doctrine offers standard 
templates for action, standard ways of doing things that have to be adapted to specific 
circumstances. Strategists and operational artists have no similar kit of generic solutions. 
The dynamics that make an operational problem unique also demand the design of a 
custom solution. Additionally, there is no way to prove that “all solutions to a wicked 
problem have been identified and considered.” Commanders may never consider some 
solutions, either because they are too exotic or because self-imposed constraints limit 
potential actions.  
(5) Solutions to ill-structured problems are better-or-worse, not right-or-wrong. 
There is no objective measure of success and different stakeholders may disagree about 
the quality of a solution. The suitability of a solution will depend upon how the individual 
stakeholders have formulated the problem and what constitutes success for them.  
(6) Ill-structured problems are interactively complex. Operational problems are 
socially complex because people have tremendous freedom of interaction. Since 
interactively complex problems are non-linear, a relatively minor action can create 
disproportionately large effects. The same action performed on the same problem at a 
later time may produce a different result. Interactive complexity makes it difficult to 
explain and predict cause and effect.  
(7) Every solution to an ill-structured problem is a ‘one-shot operation.’ Every 
attempted course of action has effects that create a new situation and cannot be undone. 
The consequences of military action are effectively irreversible. Whenever actions are 
irreversible and the duration of their effects is long, every attempted action counts.  
(8) There is no immediate and no ultimate test of a solution to an ill-structured 
problem. The perceived quality of a solution to an ill-structured problem can change over 
time. Speaking metaphorically, yesterday’s solution might appear good today, but 
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disastrous tomorrow as the unintended effects become clearer. In the discussion of 
measures of effectiveness, JP 5-0 notes that measurable results to a particular action may 
not appear for some time. This time lag complicates assessment enormously, because in 
the meantime the operational command may have executed other actions, which will 
make assessing cause and effect even more difficult.  
(9) Ill-structured problems have no ‘stopping rule’. It is impossible to say 
conclusively that such a problem has been solved in the sense that a student knows when 
he has solved a math problem. Work on a wicked problem will continue until strategic 
leaders judge the situation is “good enough,” or until national interest, will, or resources 
have been diverted or exhausted.  
(10) Every ill-structured problem is a symptom of another problem. The causal 
explanation for a problem will determine the range of possible solutions. Yet, solving one 
problem often reveals another higher level problem of which the original one was a 
symptom. The level at which an operational problem is solved depends among other 
things upon the authority, confidence, and resources of a particular commander. One 
should not simply cure symptoms, but should rather strive to solve the problem at the 
highest possible level. However, if the problem is formulated at too high a level, the 
broader and more general it becomes and therefore the less likely it is to solve particular 
aspects of the specific problem.  
(11) The problem-solver has no right to be wrong. The writ of an operational 
commander and his staff is to improve the state of affairs in the world as his countrymen 
perceive it. Like others in Government service, he is responsible for the consequences of 
the actions he generates. 
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APPENDIX B: GLOSSARY 
civil affairs — Designated Active and Reserve Component forces and units 
organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs operations and to 
support civil-military operations. Also called CA. See also civil affairs activities; 
civilmilitary operations. (Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008a, p. 88) 
civil affairs activities — Activities performed or supported by civil affairs that 
(1) enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in areas where 
military forces are present; and (2) involve application of civil affairs functional specialty 
skills, in areas normally the responsibility of civil government, to enhance conduct of 
civilmilitary operations. See also civil affairs; civil-military operations. (Office of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008a, p. 88) 
civil-military operations. The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, 
influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and 
nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a 
friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations to 
consolidate and achieve operational U.S. objectives. Civil-military operations may 
include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the 
responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur 
prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, 
in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed 
by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs 
and other forces. Also called CMO. (Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008a, p. 88) 
conventional. Activities, operations, organizations, capabilities, etc., of the 
regular armed forces of a country that are capable of conducting military operations using 
non-nuclear weapons, but excluding designated special operations forces. (Proposed) 
(U.S. Special Operations Command & Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 
2007, p. B-2) 
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conventional forces — 1. Those forces capable of conducting operations using 
nonnuclear weapons. 2. Those forces other than designated special operations forces. (JP 
3-05) (Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008a, p. 124) 
counterinsurgency — Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, 
psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. Also called 
COIN. (Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008a, p. 130) 
counterterrorism — Operations that include the offensive measures taken to 
prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism. Also called CT. See also 
antiterrorism; combating terrorism; terrorism. (JP 3-05) (Office of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, 2008a, p. 132) 
foreign internal defense — Participation by civilian and military agencies of a 
government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other 
designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and 
insurgency. Also called FID. (JP 3-05) (Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008a, p. 216) 
guerrilla — A combat participant in guerrilla warfare. See also unconventional 
warfare. (Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008a, p. 235) 
guerrilla warfare — Military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-
held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces. Also called GW. 
See also unconventional warfare. (JP 3-05.1) (Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008a, 
P. 235) 
indirect methods (or means). The term “indirect approach” has three distinct 
meanings within the context of IW: 1. Unbalance and dislocate adversaries by attacking 
them physically and psychologically where they are most vulnerable and unsuspecting, 
rather than where they are strongest or in the manner they expect to be attacked. 2. 
Empower, enable, and leverage IA and multinational strategic partners to attack 
adversaries militarily or non-militarily, rather than relying on direct and unilateral 
military confrontation by U.S. joint forces. 3. Take actions with or against other states or 
armed groups in order to influence adversaries, rather than taking actions to influence 
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adversaries directly. (Proposed) (U.S. Special Operations Command & Marine Corps 
Combat Development Command, 2007, P. b-3) 
insurgency. 1. An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted 
government through use of subversion and armed conflict. (JP 1-02) 2. An organized, 
armed political struggle whose goal may be the seizure of power through revolutionary 
takeover and replacement of the existing government. However, insurgencies’ goals may 
be more limited. Insurgencies generally follow a revolutionary doctrine and use armed 
force as an instrument of policy. (FM 100-20, 1990) 3. An organized movement aimed at 
the overthrow of an established government or societal structure, or the expulsion of a 
foreign military presence, through the use of subversion and armed conflict. (Proposed by 
U.S. Special Operations Command) (U.S. Special Operations Command & Marine Corps 
Combat Development Command, 2007, P. B-3) 
insurgent — Member of a political party who rebels against established 
leadership. See also antiterrorism; counterinsurgency; insurgency. (JP 3-07.2) (Office 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008a, p. 269) 
irregular. Activities, operations, organizations, capabilities, etc., in which 
significant numbers of combatants engage in insurgency and other nonconventional 
military and paramilitary operations without being members of the regular armed forces, 
police, or other internal security forces of any country. See also conventional, 
nonconventional. (Proposed) (U.S. Special Operations Command & Marine Corps 
Combat Development Command, 2007, pp. B-3 to B-4) 
irregular forces. Armed individuals or groups who are not members of the 
regular armed forces, police, or other internal security forces. (Office of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, 2008a, p. 283) 
irregular warfare. A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for 
legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. Irregular warfare favors indirect 




capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will. Also called IW. 
(Proposed) (U.S. Special Operations Command & Marine Corps Combat Development 
Command, 2007, p. B-4)  
irregular warfare campaign. A campaign that primarily focuses on irregular 
warfare operations or activities. (Proposed) (U.S. Special Operations Command & 
Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 2007, p. B-4) 
low-intensity conflict. Political-military confrontation between contending states 
or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among 
states. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. 
Low intensity conflict ranges from subversion to the use of armed force. It is waged by a 
combination of means, employing political, economic, informational, and military 
instruments. Low intensity conflicts are localized generally in the Third World, but 
contain regional and global security implications. Also called LIC. (U.S. Special 
Operations Command & Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 2007, p. B-4) 
military support to security, stability, transition, and reconstruction. 
Department of Defense activities that support U.S. government plans for stabilization, 
security, reconstruction, and transition operations, which lead to sustainable peace while 
advancing U.S. interests. (DODD 3000.05) 
national defense strategy — A document approved by the Secretary of Defense 
for applying the Armed Forces of the United States in coordination with Department of 
Defense agencies and other instruments of national power to achieve national security 
strategy objectives. Also called NDS. (JP 3-0) (Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008a, 
p. 368) 
National Military Strategy — A document approved by the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff for distributing and applying military power to attain national 
security strategy and national defense strategy objectives. Also called NMS. See also 
National Security Strategy; strategy; theater strategy. (JP 3-0) (Office of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, 2008a, p. 370) 
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national policy — A broad course of action or statements of guidance adopted by 
the government at the national level in pursuit of national objectives. (Office of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, 2008a, p. 370) 
national security — A collective term encompassing both national defense and 
foreign relations of the United States. Specifically, the condition provided by: a. a 
military or defense advantage over any foreign nation or group of nations; b. a favorable 
foreign relations position; or c. a defense posture capable of successfully resisting hostile 
or destructive action from within or without, overt or covert. See also security. (Office of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008a, p. 370) 
National Security Strategy — A document approved by the President of the 
United States for developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national 
power to achieve objectives that contribute to national security. Also called NSS. See 
also National Military Strategy; strategy; theater strategy. (JP 3-0) (Office of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008a, p. 371) 
nation assistance — Civil and/or military assistance rendered to a nation by 
foreign forces within that nation’s territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or 
war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. Nation assistance 
programs include, but are not limited to, security assistance, foreign internal defense, 
other Title 10, U.S. Code programs, and activities performed on a reimbursable basis by 
Federal agencies or intergovernmental organizations. (JP 3-0) (Office of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, 2008a, pp. 371-372) 
non-state actor. A group or organization that is not within the formal structure of 
any state, not limited by any state boundary, and operates beyond the control of any state 
and without loyalty to any state. Examples include international organizations, 
nongovernmental organizations, political parties, labor unions, commercial trade 
associations, criminal enterprises, and armed groups such as insurgent and terrorist 
organizations, informal armed militias, and private military companies. See also armed 
group, nongovernmental organization. (Proposed) (U.S. Special Operations Command 
& Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 2007, p. B-5) 
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psychological operations — Planned operations to convey selected information 
and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective 
reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, 
and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign 
attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. Also called PSYOP. See 
also overt peacetime psychological operations programs; perception management. 
(JP 3-53) (Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008a, p. 441) 
reconstruction operations. Operations to establish or rebuild the critical 
political, social, and economic systems or infrastructure necessary to facilitate long-term 
security and the transition to legitimate local governance in an operational area. See also 
stability operations. (Derived from SSTR JOC) (U.S. Special Operations Command & 
Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 2007, p. B-6) 
security forces. Police and constabulary forces, as well as military and 
paramilitary forces, that protect societies from criminal, terrorist, and other threats to 
public order. (Proposed) (U.S. Special Operations Command & Marine Corps Combat 
Development Command, 2007, p. B-6) 
special operations. Operations conducted in hostile, denied, or politically 
sensitive environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic 
objectives employing military capabilities for which there is no broad conventional force 
requirement. These operations often require covert, clandestine, or low visibility 
capabilities. Special operations are applicable across the range of military operations. 
They can be conducted independently or in conjunction with operations of conventional 
forces or other government agencies and may include operations through, with, or by 
indigenous or surrogate forces. Special operations differ from conventional operations in 
degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, 
independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence 
and indigenous assets. Also called SO. (JP 3-05) (U.S. Special Operations Command & 
Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 2007, pp. B-6 to B-7) 
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stability operations. (1) An overarching term encompassing various military 
missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with 
other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure 
environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure 
reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (JP 1-02) (2) Military and civilian activities 
conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in 
states and regions. (DODD 3000.05) 
strategic level of war. (1) The level of war at which a nation, often as a member 
of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) security 
objectives and guidance and develops and uses national resources to accomplish these 
objectives. Activities at this level establish national and multinational military objectives; 
sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risks of the use of military and other 
instruments of national power; develop global plans or theater war plans to achieve these 
objectives; and provide military forces and other capabilities in accordance with strategic 
plans. (JP 1-02) (2) The level of war at which a state or non-state actor, often as a 
member of an alliance or coalition, determines strategic objectives and guidance and 
develops and uses its resources to accomplish these objectives. Activities at this level 
establish strategic military objectives; sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risks 
of the use of military and other instruments of power; develop global or theater plans to 
achieve these objectives; and provide military forces and other capabilities in accordance 
with strategic plans. (U.S. Special Operations Command & Marine Corps Combat 
Development Command, 2007, P. B-7) 
task. A discrete action performed by an individual or organization to accomplish 
a mission. Tasks specify what actions must be performed, not who will perform them, 
how they will be performed, or what means will be employed to perform them. (CJCSM 
3500.04C) (U.S. Special Operations Command & Marine Corps Combat Development 
Command, 2007, p. B-8) 
terrorism. The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence 
to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the 
pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. (JP 1-02) The 
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calculated use or threat of unlawful political violence against noncombatants, intended to 
coerce or intimidate governments or societies through fear. (Proposed) (U.S. Special 
Operations Command & Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 2007, p. B-8)  
terrorist — An individual who commits an act or acts of violence or threatens 
violence in pursuit of political, religious, or ideological objectives. See also terrorism. 
(JP 3-07.2) (Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008a, p. 553) 
terrorist group — Any number of terrorists who assemble together, have a 
unifying relationship, or are organized for the purpose of committing an act or acts of 
violence or threatens violence in pursuit of their political, religious, or ideological 
objectives. See also terrorism. (JP 3-07.2) (Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008a, p. 
553) 
unconventional warfare — A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary 
operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted through, with, or by 
indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and 
directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes, but is not limited to, 
guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional 
assisted recovery. Also called UW. (JP 3-05) (Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008a, 
p. 574) 
ungoverned area. An operational area in which no effective government exists to 
control the territory and population, or over which the state government is unable to 
extend control. (Proposed) (U.S. Special Operations Command & Marine Corps Combat 
Development Command, 2007, p. B-8) 
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APPENDIX C: CENTER FOR GLOBALIZATION AND SECURITY 
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APPENDIX D: CAQC COURSE SUMMARY (AS OF SEPTEMBER 
2008)  
Course Summary    
 
Academic Time: 
Module: A / 001 32.6 
Title: Civil Affairs Skills and Knowledge 
Module: B / 001 20.4 
Title: Military Knowledge 
Module: C / 001 19.0 
Title: Cultural Education 
Module: G / 001 27.0 
Title: Adaptive Thinking and Leadership 
Module: H / 001 34.0 
Title: Planning 
Module: I / 001 67.0 
Title: Civil Affairs Operations 
Module: J / 001 18.0 
Title: Program Management 
Module: K / 001 31.0 
Title: Civil Affairs Core Tasks 
Module: M / 001 220.0 
Title: Regional Research and Analysis 
Module: N / 001 85.1 
Title: Warrior Tasks and Battle Drills 
Module: O / 001 42.9 
Title: Mission Planning - CPX 
Module: P / 001 48.0 
Title: Soldier's Urban Reaction Facility - STX 
Module: Q / 001 160.0 
Title: Civil Affairs Operation - STX 
Module: R / 001  
Title: Non-Academic Administrative Times 
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Module: A / 001 32.6 
Title: Civil Affairs Skills and Knowledge 
 
Purpose: This module is designed to train Soldiers on general Civil Affairs skills and 
knowledge. 
Remarks: This module trains on general skills and knowledge, along with Civil Affairs 
Critical Individual Tasks:  331-38B-1003 - Identify the Steps of Civil Affairs 
Methodology; 331-38B-1004 - Define Civil Information Management; 331-
38B-1010 - Define the Civil Affairs Functional Specialty Areas; 331-38B-
1012 - Define Foreign Humanitarian Assistance; 331-38B-1013 - Define 
Populace and Resources Control; 331-38B-1018 - Define Support to Civil 
Administration; 331-38B-1020 - Describe the Organization and Function of a 
Civil-Military Operations Center; 331-38B-1032 - Define Transition 
Operations; 331-38B-1035 - Identify the Organization and Function of Civil 
Affairs; 331-38B-1036 - Identify the Functions and Responsibilities of the 
Civil-Military Operations Staff Section; 331-38B-1040 - Define Nation 
Assistance; 331-38B-2011 - Identify the Capabilities of Other Organizations 
in Support of Civil-Military Operations; and331-38B-2012 -Conduct Liaison 
with Other Organization. 
 
Lesson Title: The History of Civil-Military Operations and U.S. Army Civil Affairs 
Action Text: Describe aspects of the history of Civil-Military Operations (CMO) and  
U.S. Army Civil Affairs (CA). 
 
Lesson Title: U.S. Army Special Operations Structure and Missions 
 
Action Text: Determine Special Operations Forces (SOF) Organization, Capabilities 
and Core Missions 
 
Lesson Title: Civil-Military Operations 
Action Text: Describe the Concepts and Principles of Civil Affairs' Support to Civil-
Military Operations 
 
Lesson Title: Civil-Military Operations Staff Structure and Function 
 
Action Text: Describe the Functions and Responsibilities of the Civil-Military 
Operations Staff Section 
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Lesson Title: Civil Affairs Structure and Function 
Action Text: Describe the Civil Affairs Structure and Function 
 
Lesson Title: Civil Affairs Support to Full Spectrum Operations 
Action Text: Identify the characteristics and components of Full Spectrum Operations 
 
Lesson Title: Unconventional Warfare 
Action Text: Identify aspects of unconventional warfare (UW) 
 
Lesson Title: Foreign Internal Defense 
Action Text: Identify aspects of Foreign Internal Defense (FID) 
 
Lesson Title: Counter Insurgency 
Action Text: Identify aspects of counter insurgency (COIN) 
 
Lesson Title: Provincial Reconstruction Teams 
Action Text: Describe the function and structure of provincial reconstruction teams. 
 
Lesson Title: Intergovernmental Organizations, Nongovernmental Organizations, and 
Other Government Agencies 
Action Text: Describe the Roles and Functions of Intergovernmental Organizations, 
Nongovernmental Organizations, and Other Government Agencies 
 
Lesson Title: Overview Civil Affairs Methodology 
Action Text: Describe Civil Affairs Methodology 
Lesson Title: Civil Affairs Concepts and Principles 
Action Text: Describe the Concepts and Principles of Civil Affairs 
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Module: B / 001 
Title: Military Knowledge 
Purpose: This module is designed to train Soldiers on general military skills and 
knowledge. 
Remarks: This module trains Civil Affairs Critical Tasks:  331-305-0610 - Integrate 
With the Supported Staff; 331-38B-1037 - Identify Command Relations; 331-
38B-1039 - Identify Army Staff Structure and Responsibilities; 331-38B-3023 
- Identify Joint Force Staff Structure, Responsibilities, and Operations; 331-
38B-1024 - Conduct Military Briefings; 331-38B-1029 - Process Classified 
Material; 331-305-0801 - Conduct a Media Interview; 331-38B-1022 - 
Prepare for a Media Interview; 331-38B-2009 - Implement the Use of 
Interpreters in Civil Affairs Operations; and 331-38B-1001 - Identify the 
Basic Steps Involved in the Problem Solving Process. 
 
Lesson Title: Army Command and Staff Structure 
Action Text: Describe the Army Command and Staff Structure 
Lesson Title: Joint Command and Staff Structure 
Action Text: Identify Joint Force Staff Structure, Responsibilities, and Operations 
Lesson Title: Law of Armed Conflict 
Action Text: Describe the rules of law to situations encountered in all levels of conflict 
Lesson Title: Property Control 
Action Text: Apply Property Control Measures Applicable to Occupying Force and to 
Forces Engaged in Combat Activities 
Lesson Title: Military Briefings 
Action Text: Present a Military Briefings 
Action Text: Safeguard classified materials and documents 
Condition: In a classroom environment, given instruction on classified material and a 
student study guide. 
Lesson Title: Media 
Action Text: Prepare for a Media Interview 
Lesson Title: Interpreters 
Action Text: Describe the Concepts for Using Interpreters 
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Lesson Title: Terrorism 
Action Text: Describe the doctrine of terrorist organizations and tactics. 
Lesson Title: Basic Problem Solving Process 

























APPENDIX E: JOINT CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS 
CAMPAIGN PLANNING WORKSHOP SYLLABUS (AS OF 
SEPTEMBER 2008) 
Course Code:  SOED-JCMOCPW       Duration:  5 Days 
PDS Code: [None]      Security Level:  UNCLASS 
 
  Course Director     
Name:   Mr. Terry Doan, Ops Dept Deputy     
Telephone: (850) 884-1841     
DSN:  579-1841      
Fax:  (850) 884-4333     
E-Mail: Gilbert.Doan@hurlburt.af.mil   
Course Description 
This course will educate students on how to apply joint civil-military operations (CMO) 
doctrine to successfully conduct operational-level CMO campaign planning to support a 
joint force commander's mission, emphasizing the Joint  Operational Planning Process 
(JOPP) and incorporating the interaction between military staff members and 
representatives of other U.S. government agencies, international organizations, and non-
governmental organizations. The Joint CMO Campaign Planning Workshop uses faculty 
speakers, guest experts, and an end-of-course exercise. Personnel will work in an 
academic environment analyzing the civil dimension, developing and coordinating staff 
estimates and courses of action, and presenting a Course of Action (COA) decision brief 
with recommended CA force structure; they will participate in an after-action review. 
 
Target Audience: Civil affairs majors and lieutenant colonels; preference will be given 
to potential CMO planners in those positions most likely to deploy. Personnel with 
deployment experience and/or planning experience at JTF/corps/division level are also 
desired. Personnel outside the target audience will be accepted on a space-available basis. 
 
Course Objectives  
1. ESW understand the complexities of the civil-military planning environment  
2. ESW understand the fundamentals of joint doctrine, especially as it relates to 
CMO.  
3. ESW understand the relationship of the Joint Operations Planning and Execution      
System (JOPES) and the Joint Operational Planning Process (JOPP) in CMO 
planning. 
4. ESW apply JOPP procedures and the CMO perspective to a scenario driven 






Lesson 1 Interagency Planning and Coordination  
Lesson focuses on introducing CMO planners to the interagency community and 
processes. Discussion includes the members of the community and their outlook on 
planning ands coordination, an expanded definition of the instruments of national power, 
and the dynamics of interagency coordination and political-military planning. 
 
OBJECTIVE:  ESW understand the difficulties involved in planning and coordination 
within the interagency environment. 
 
Cognitive Measurable Samples of Behavior: 
Identify the members of the interagency community. 
Explain the differences in problem-solving processes between various agencies . 
Explain how national strategic guidance is implemented during planning. 
 
Affective Measurable Samples of Behavior: 
Discuss how better understanding the interagency process will enable civil-military staff 
personnel to more effectively support their commanders. 
Ask insightful questions during the lesson on the applications of this process to the CMO 
planning environment. 
 
Course Objective Link:  1-3    
 
Lesson 2 Joint Civil Affairs Concepts and Planning 
Lesson focuses on civil affairs operations in the joint community.  Discussion includes a 
recap of the six civil affairs mission areas, an explanation of key civil-military operations 
planning considerations, and a discussion of Joint CMO Task Force organization and 
functions. 
 
OBJECTIVE:  ESW understand the unique aspects of joint civil affairs operations. 
 
Cognitive Measurable Samples of Behavior: 
Outline the range of military operations. 
Distinguish between civil-military operations (CMO) and civil affairs (CA). 
Identify civil-military missions in support of major regional conflicts and other combat 
operations. 
Outline the types and nature of CMO. 
Outline the concept of civil affairs employment. 
Explain the general CMO planning considerations. 
Explain the CMO planning considerations for Military Operations other Than War 
(MOOTW) 
Explain the advantages and disadvantages of establishing a Joint Civil-Military 
Operations Task Force (JCMOTF). 
Explain the potential organization and responsibilities of a JCMOTF. 
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Affective Measurable Samples of Behavior: 
Discuss the difference between civil-military operations and civil affairs. 
Discuss civil-military operations planning considerations. 
Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of a JCMOTF. 
  
Course Objective Link:  1-2 
 
Lesson 3 Analysis of the Civil Environment 
Lesson focuses on providing students with a rubric for analyzing the civil dimension of 
the operational environment. Discussion includes the six categories of the rubric and the 
relevance of civil reconnaissance and MOEs. 
 
OBJECTIVE:  ESW understand the process for analyzing the civil dimension and using 
that to support planning. 
 
Cognitive Measurable Samples of Behavior: 
Using process for analyzing the civil dimension (as outlined in JP 3-57.1, Ch VII), 
summarize a CMO staff assessment (Estimate) examining the six interrelated factors:  
key civil geographic areas, infrastructure and buildings, institutional capabilities, 
influential organizations, key communications and populace, and events. 
Explain how Civil Reconnaissance will support the planning process. 
Explain the use of proper Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) in supporting operational 
planning. 
 
Affective Measurable Samples of Behavior: 
Discuss how better analyzing the civil dimension will enable civil-military staff 
personnel to more effectively support their commanders. 
Ask insightful questions during the lesson on the applications of this process to the CMO 
planning environment. 
  
Course Objective Link:  1-2 
 
Lesson 4 Joint Campaign Planning       
Lesson focuses on providing the students with a basic understanding of the fundamentals 
of campaign planning. Discussion includes the many sources of national guidance and 
theater strategy, the instruments of national power, and fundamentals of campaign design. 
 
OBJECTIVE:  ESW understand the fundamentals of joint planning, especially as they 
apply to campaign planning.  
 
Cognitive Measurable Samples of Behavior: 
Identify the two broad categories of joint military planning. 
Distinguish between the five types of joint operation plans. 
Distinguish between the seven types of joint operation orders. 
Explain the critical planning factors to include center of gravity. 
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Describe the elements of operational design to include the concepts of decisive points, 
timing and tempo, culmination, and synergy. 
 
Affective Measurable Samples of Behavior: 
Discuss how better understanding the joint planning process will enable civil-military 
staff personnel to more effectively support their commanders. 
Ask insightful questions during the lesson on the application of CMO considerations to 
the joint planning process. 
  
Course Objective Link:   1-3 
 
Lesson 5 Legal and Fiscal Issues in CMO 
Lesson focuses on legal and fiscal issues which will impact on CMO planners. 
Discussion includes international law issues (responsibilities of an occupying force, 
combatant-non-combatant issues, host nation/coalition issues), domestic law issues (fiscal 
constraints, Rules of Engagement), and Human Rights issues. 
 
OBJECTIVE:  ESW understand the legal and fiscal issues confronting the CMO 
practitioner in the operational area. 
 
Cognitive Measurable Samples of Behavior: 
Identify the various sources of funding used to support CMO. 
Identify the legal issues likely to face the CMO practitioner. 
Explain the importance of keeping the Staff Judge Advocate informed on all legal and 
fiscal issues. 
 
Affective Measurable Samples of Behavior: 
Discuss the potential negative consequences of legal and fiscal missteps. 
Help other students understand the importance of keeping the unit legal advisor involved. 
 
Course Objective Link:   1-3      
 
Lesson 6 JOPES 
Lessons focuses on the components of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution 
System (JOPES). Discussion includes national and strategic guidance, the military 
decision-making process, and the steps in and interrelationships between the deliberate 
planning and crisis action planning processes. 
 
OBJECTIVE:  ESW understand the basics of JOPES, the deliberate planning process, 
and the JTF Crisis Action Planning (CAP) process.  
 
Cognitive Measurable Samples of Behavior: 
Describe the Joint Planning and Execution Community. 
Describe the Contingency Planning Process  
Describe Crisis Action Planning. 
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Describe the Adaptive Planning Process  
 
Affective Measurable Samples of Behavior: 
Discuss how understanding JOPES will enable civil-military staff personnel to more 
effectively support their commanders. 
Ask insightful questions during the lesson on the applications of JOPES to the CMO 
planning environment. 
  
Course Objective Link:   1-3 
 
Lesson 7  JTF Operations and Concepts 
Lesson focuses on formation, structure, and organization of a joint task force (JTF). 
Discussion includes how joint forces are organized, what the command and control 
relationships are, how a JTF staff is organized, and who in a JTF is responsible for 
operational planning. 
 
OBJECTIVE:  ESW understand the fundamentals of joint operations and JTFs.  
 
Cognitive Measurable Samples of Behavior: 
Define the levels of war (strategic, operational, and tactical) 
Explain the unified action scope at various levels of command (Fig II-2, JP 3-0) 
Distinguish between the various command relationships (COCOM, OPCON, TACON, 
and Support (to include categories of support)) (JP 3-0, (Ch III)) 
Describe the basic organization of forces (combatant commands, unified commands, 
specified commands, subordinate unified commands, and joint task forces (JTF), service 
components, and functional components (include JSOTF & JCMOTF)) (JP 3-57, Fig I-8) 
Identify the basic organization of a joint operational area 
 
Affective Measurable Samples of Behavior: 
Discuss the importance of understanding how the civil-military operations staff section is 
relevant to the organization and functions of a Joint Task Force.  
Ask insightful questions during the lesson on the application of CMO considerations to 
the JTF operations. 
 
Course Objective Link:  1-3 
 
Lesson 8 Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP) for CMO 
Lesson focuses on making students more familiar with the joint operation planning 
process. Discussion includes developing a CMO Staff Estimate and then developing, 
analyzing, comparing, and selecting CMO Courses of Action, and including other 
planning considerations. 
 
OBJECTIVE:  ESW understand the CMO planning factors and perspectives in JOPP.  
 
Cognitive Measurable Samples of Behavior: 
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Explain the seven steps of the JOPP 
Describe the Mission Analysis step 
Describe the COA Development step 
Describe the COA Analysis and Wargaming step 
Describe the COA Comparison step 
 
Affective Measurable Samples of Behavior: 
Discuss how better understanding the joint operation planning process (JOPP) will enable 
civil-military staff personnel to more effectively support their commanders. 
Ask insightful questions during the lesson on the applications of this process to the CMO 
planning environment. 
 
Course Objective Link:   1-3 
 
Lesson 9 Medical Issues in CMO 
 
Lesson 10 Practical Exercise: Analysis of Civil Dimension 
Lesson focuses on student application of the course learning objectives to a given 
scenario.  Students will apply the analysis rubric taught in the course to  a given fictional 
scenario. 
 
OBJECTIVES:   
ESW apply the process for analyzing the civil dimension to the emerging crisis 
 
Cognitive Measurable Samples of Behavior: 
Using process for analyzing the civil dimension (as outlined in JP 3-57.1, Ch VII), 
prepare a CMO staff assessment (Estimate) examining the six interrelated factors:  key 
civil geographic areas, infrastructure and buildings, institutional capabilities, influential 
organizations, key communications and populace, and events. 
Determine the appropriate Civil Center of Gravity, Named Civil Interests, Targeted Civil 
Interests, and Decisive Civil Engagement Points (FM 3-05.401) 
Produce a briefing to their group leader on their analysis of the civil dimension 
 
Affective Measurable Samples of Behavior: 
Identify the significant factors in the scenario relevant to CMO. 
Share thoughts with others in the group on the analysis of the civil dimension. 
 
Course Objective Link:  1-4 
    
Lesson 11 Practical Exercise: Mission Analysis  
Lesson focuses on student application of the course learning objectives to a given 





OBJECTIVES:   
 
ESW apply the process for analyzing a mission after receipt of a warning order in a given 
scenario. 
 
Cognitive Measurable Samples of Behavior: 
Distinguish key facts and assumptions that are relevant to CMO planning during mission 
analysis. 
Determine, during mission analysis, relevant constraints and restraints (JP 3-57, Ch III) 
based upon provided commander JTF (CJTF) planning guidance, intent (end state) and 
overall mission parameters. 
Explain whether or not this operation should have a predominantly CMO center of 
gravity (critical factor). 
Analyze commander’s mission and intent. 
Identify tasks. 
Conduct risk analysis. 
Determine end state. 
Develop mission statement. 
Produce a briefing to their group leader on their analysis of the mission.  
 
Affective Measurable Samples of Behavior: 
Identify the significant factors in the scenario relevant to CMO. 
Propose ideas for the recommended revised mission statement. 
Assist in the development of the Mission Analysis briefing. 
 
Course Objective Link:  1-4 
 
Lesson 12 Practical Exercise: CMO COA Development and Analysis 
Lesson focuses on student application of the course learning objectives to a given 
scenario. Students will apply selected steps of the joint operation planning process to 
develop and select a CMO Course of Action. 
 
OBJECTIVES:   
ESW apply the process for analyzing the civil dimension to the emerging crisis 
ESW apply the CMO planning perspective, factors, and processes to the given scenario. 
ESW apply the four phases of JTF operational planning process (mission analysis, COA 
development, COA analysis, and COA comparison) to produce and deliver a decision 
briefing 
 
Cognitive Measurable Samples of Behavior: 
Explain whether or not this operation should have a predominantly CMO center of 
gravity (critical factor). 
Infer, during course of action (COA) development, the relevant perspectives based on 
CMO planning considerations  
Extend the key factors of operational art to the COA analysis process.  
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Produce a recommended COA, based upon COA comparison that includes operational 
concepts for campaign planning decisive points, phasing/sequencing, and relevant CMO 
lines of operation. 
Produce a recommended CA force structure to support the recommended COA. 
 
Affective Measurable Samples of Behavior: 
Identify the significant factors in the scenario relevant to CMO. 
Propose ideas for the recommended Course of Action (COA). 
Proposed ideas for the recommended force structure. 
Assist in the development of the COA briefing. 
 
Course Objective Link:  1-4 
 
Lesson 13 Practical Exercise: CMO COA Decision Brief 
Lesson focuses on student application of the course learning objectives to a given 
scenario. Students will brief their selected CMO COA to the Course Senior Mentor. 
 
OBJECTIVES:   
ESW apply the four phases of JOPP (mission analysis, COA development, COA analysis,        
and COA comparison) to produce and deliver a decision briefing  
 
Cognitive Measurable Samples of Behavior: 
Produce a decision briefing with a recommended COA and force structure. 
 
Affective Measurable Samples of Behavior: 
Assist in the delivery of the COA briefing. 
 
Course Objective Link:  1-4 
 
Lesson 14 Future Civil-Military Operations Issues (Lecture of Opportunity) 
Lesson focuses on the future of Civil Affairs and CMO. Discussion includes new 
capabilities, emerging doctrinal issues, and planned changes to CA force structure. 
 
OBJECTIVE:  ESW know the future issues facing the civil affairs community and the 
emerging doctrine and trends. 
 
Cognitive Measurable Samples of Behavior: 
Identify the future issues facing the civil-affairs community to include 
emerging/undefined capabilities. 
Outline emerging civil affairs doctrine, missions, and trends. 
 
Affective Measurable Samples of Behavior: 
Discuss how better understanding future issues will enable civil-military staff personnel 
to more effectively support their commanders. 
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Ask insightful questions during the lesson on the applications of future environment to 
the CMO planning environment. 
 
Course Objective Link:   1-3 
 
Lesson 15 CA Information Management (Lecture of Opportunity) 
Lesson focuses on making students familiar with the latest techniques and procedures for 
information management in civil-military operations. Discussion includes an introduction 
to the DOS Humanitarian Information Unit, the technologies available and currently in 
use, and current Civil Affairs initiatives in information management. 
 
OBJECTIVE:  ESW understand the tools and processes available to support information 
management in support of CMO. 
 
Cognitive Measurable Samples of Behavior: 
Identify the tools and technologies available to support information management in 
CMO. 
Explain why it is important to effectively manage information in CMO. 
Give examples of how information management techniques are being used operationally 
in support of CMO  
 
Affective Measurable Samples of Behavior: 
Discuss how better understanding information management processes will enable civil-
military staff personnel to more effectively support their commanders. 
Ask insightful questions during the lesson on the applications of these processes to the 
CMO planning environment. 
 
Course Objective Link:   1-2 
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